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Abstract
We study statistical risk minimization problems under a privacy model in which the data
is kept confidential even from the learner. In this local privacy framework, we establish sharp
upper and lower bounds on the convergence rates of statistical estimation procedures. As a
consequence, we exhibit a precise tradeoff between the amount of privacy the data preserves and
the utility, as measured by convergence rate, of any statistical estimator or learning procedure.
1 Introduction
Natural tensions between learning and privacy arise whenever a learner must aggregate data across
multiple individuals. The learner wishes to make optimal use of each data point, whereas the
providers of the data may wish to limit detailed exposure, either to the learner or to other indi-
viduals. A characterization of such tensions in the form of quantitative tradeoffs is of great utility:
it can inform public discourse surrounding the design of systems that learn from data, and the
tradeoffs can be exploited as controllable degrees of freedom whenever such a system is deployed.
In this paper, we approach this problem from the point of view of statistical decision theory.
The decision-theoretic perspective offers a number of advantages. First, the use of loss functions
and risk functions provides a compelling formal foundation for defining “learning”, one that dates
back to Wald [46], and that has seen continued development in the context of research on machine
learning over the past two decades. Second, by formulating the goals of a learning system in terms
of loss functions, we make it possible for individuals to assess whether the goals of a learning system
align with their own personal utility, and thereby determine the extent to which they are willing
to sacrifice some privacy. Third, an appeal to decision theory permits abstraction over the details
of specific learning procedures, allowing for the derivation of minimax lower bounds that apply
to any specific procedure. Fourth, the use of loss functions—and more specifically, convex loss
functions—in the design of a learning system allows the powerful tools of optimization theory to
be brought to bear. Not only are optimization-based learning systems often successful in practice,
but they are also often amenable to theoretical analysis. Finally, the decision-theoretic framework
is a probabilistic framework, with probabilistic models definining the transformation from losses
to risks. This connection provides a natural mechanism for the use of randomization to provide
control over privacy.
In more formal detail, the analysis of this paper takes place within the following framework.
Given a compact convex set Θ ⊂ Rd, we wish to find a parameter value θ ∈ Θ achieving good
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average performance under a loss function ℓ : X × Rd → R+. Here the value ℓ(X, θ) measures the
performance of the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ on the sample X ∈ X , and ℓ(x, ·) : Rd → R+ is convex
for x ∈ X . We measure the expected performance of θ ∈ Θ via the risk function
θ 7→ R(θ) := EP [ℓ(X, θ)], (1)
where the expectation is taken over some unknown distribution P over the space X .
In the standard formulation of statistical risk minimization, a method M is given n samples
X1, . . . ,Xn, each drawn independently from P , and its goal to to output an estimate θ̂n that
approximately minimizes the risk function R. In this paper, instead of providing the method M
with access to the samples X1, . . . ,Xn, however, we study the effect of giving only some disguised
view Zi of each datum Xi. With θ̂n now denoting an estimator based on the perturbed samples Zi,
we explicitly quantify the rate of convergence of R(θ̂n) to infθ∈ΘR(θ) as a function of the number
of samples n and the amount of privacy provided by Zi.
1.1 Prior work
There is a long history of research at the intersection of privacy and statistics, going back at least to
the 1960s, when Warner [47] suggested privacy-preserving methods for survey sampling, and to later
work related to census taking and presentation of tabular data (e.g., [20]). More recently, there has
been a large amount of computationally-oriented work on privacy [17, 15, 51, 48, 24, 11, 5, 7, 42].
We overview some of the key ideas in this section, but cannot hope to do justice to the large body
of relevant work, referring the reader to the comprehensive survey by Dwork [15] and the statistical
treatment by Wasserman and Zhou [48] for background and references.
Most work on privacy attempts to limit disclosure risk: the probability that some adversary can
link a released record to a particular member of the population or identify that someone belongs to
a dataset that generates a statistic [13, 14, 41, 28]. In the statistical literature, work on disclosure
limitation and so-called linkage risk, for example as in the framework of Duncan and Lambert [13],
has yielded several techniques for maintaining privacy, such as aggregation, swapping features or
responses among different datums, or perturbation of data. Other authors have proposed measures
for measuring utility of released data (e.g., [28, 9]). The currently standard measure of privacy is
differential privacy, due to Dwork et al. [17], which roughly states that θ̂n must not depend too
much on the n samples, and it should be difficult to ascertain whether a vector x belongs to the
set {X1, . . . ,Xn} given θ̂n. Formally, paraphrasing the definition of Wasserman and Zhou [48], the
method M has α-differential privacy if
sup
S∈σ(Θ)
sup
x1,...,xn
sup
x′
1
,...,x′n
Q(S | X1 = x1, . . . ,Xn = xn)
Q(S | X1 = x′1, . . . ,Xn = x′n)
≤ exp(α). (2)
where the sets x1, . . . , xn and x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n differ in at most one element, Q(· | X1, . . . ,Xn) is (a
version of) the conditional probability of the estimator θ̂ constructed by the method M using the
n samples, and σ(Θ) is a suitable σ-algebra on Θ.
Differentially private algorithms enjoy many desirable properties [17, 15, 21] and essentially
guarantee that even if an adversary knows all the entries in a dataset but the nth, it is difficult to
discern whether a vector x is equal to Xn given the output of the method M. Indeed, differential
privacy protects against side information and many adversarial attacks that break previous defini-
tions of privacy, such as k-anonymity [21]. Several researchers have studied differentially private
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algorithms for empirical risk minimization, providing guarantees on the excess risk of differentially
private estimators θ̂. Chaudhuri et al. [7] use the stability of the output of regularized empirical
risk minimization algorithms to show that by adding Laplace-distributed noise to an empirical esti-
mator θ or by adding an additional random term to the empirical risk 1n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(Xi, θ), it is possible
to obtain differential privacy and consistency of θ̂. Dwork and Lei [16] obtain similar results using
robust statistical estimators, and Smith [44] shows that if one has suitably unbiased estimators,
then differential privacy is possible without compromising asymptotic rates of convergence. Rubin-
stein et al. [42] use similar stability and perturbation techniques to demonstrate that it is possible
to obtain differential privacy when solving support vector machine problems, and also show that
if the desired privacy level α in the definition (2) is too small, it is actually impossible to obtain a
parameter θ̂n minimizing the risk R.
Our goal is to understand the fundamental tradeoffs between maintaining privacy while still pro-
viding a useful output from the statistical learning procedureM. Though intuitively there must be
some tradeoff, quantifying it precisely has been difficult. As alluded to above, Rubinstein et al. [42]
are able to show that it is impossible to obtain what they call an (ǫ, δ)-useful parameter vector θ that
enjoys any differential privacy guarantees; however, it is unknown whether or not their guarantees
might be improvable. Hall et al. [24] show that if a given histogram, based on a sample {xi}ni=1, has
d bins and we must guarantee α-differential privacy (2), then the (expected) L1-distance between
the sample and released histograms must be at least d/(nα), and Hardt and Talwar [25] give similar
lower bounds on the amount of noise necessary to answer linear database queries. Nikolov et al.
[38] followed this work with extensions to relaxed notions (so called (α, δ)-approximate differential
privacy) of privacy and providing higher-dimensional settings, while Kasiviswanathan et al. [30]
give bounds on amounts of additive noise to protect against blatant failures of privacy in similar
linear settings. Blum et al. [5] also give lower bounds on the closeness of certain statistical quanti-
ties computed from the dataset, though their upper and lower bounds do not match. Sankar et al.
[43] provide rate-distortion theorems for utility models involving information-theoretic quantities,
which has some similarity to our risk-based framework, but it appears somewhat challenging to
explicitly map their setting onto ours. With the goal of characterizing what it means to be both
useful and private, Ghosh et al. [22] show that for a one-time computation of counts on a dataset
X1, . . . ,Xn (i.e., the number of variables satisfying Xi ∈ C for some set C), perturbing the output
of a counting function using geometrically distributed noise is the unique optimal way to guarantee
differential privacy while maximizing a natural notion of utility.
Much of the work providing sharp lower bounds, however, focuses on showing that if one wishes
to accurately report a statistic θ̂(x1:n) computed on a sample {xi}ni=1, then there must be some
worst-case sample such that the error is large (see, e.g., [25, 24, 38, 22]). In contrast, we focus
on population quantities—which are substantially different—in that we wish to return a private
estimator θ̂n approximately minimizing the population risk R(θ) = E[ℓ(X, θ)] rather than the
sample risk 1n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(Xi, θ). Providing guarantees on the population risk performance of θ̂n, rather
than on the observed sample, has been a driving force behind much of the theoretical work in
statistics and machine learning, and thus provides a natural focus for our work.
1.2 Our setting
In contrast to the above work, we study a more local notion of privacy [19, 29], in which each datum
Xi is kept private from the methodM. The goal of many types of privacy is to guarantee that the
output θ̂n of the method M based on the data cannot be used to discover information about the
individual samples X1, . . . ,Xn, but locally private algorithms only access disguised views of each
datum Xi. Local algorithms are among the most classical approaches to privacy, tracing back to
work on randomized response in the statistical literature [47], and rely on communication only of
some disguised view Zi of each true sample Xi. In this setting, for example, the natural variant of
α-differential privacy (2) is the non-interactive (in the sense that Zi depends only on Xi and not
on any other private variables Zj) local privacy guarantee
sup
S
sup
x,x′
Q(Zi ∈ S | Xi = x)
Q(Zi ∈ S | Xi = x′) ≤ exp(α). (3)
Locally private algorithms are natural when the providers of the data—the population sampled
to give X1, . . . ,Xn—do not even trust the statistician or statistical method M, but the providers
are interested in the parameter vector θ∗ that minimizes the risk function. For example, in medical
applications, a participant may be embarrassed about his use of drugs, or perhaps about his marital
status, but if the loss ℓ is able to measure the likelihood of developing cancer, then the participant
has high utility for access to the optimal parameters θ∗. Internet applications, where a user’s activity
is logged across multiple websites or searches, provide another example: the user has a utility for a
search engine to have a ranking function θ that returns relevant results for web searches, yet may
not wish to reveal his or her search data. In essence, we would like the statistical procedureM to
learn from the data X1, . . . ,Xn but not about it.
The work most related to ours seems to be that of Kasiviswanathan et al. [29], who show that
that (in some settings) locally private algorithms coincide with concepts that can be learned with
polynomial sample complexity in Kearns’s statistical query (SQ) model [31]. This result is powerful,
but has some limitations, as the statistical query model relies exclusively on count queries, and we
are interested in measures more precise than polynomial sample complexity to quantity convergence
rates. In contrast, our analysis applies to estimators deriving from a broad class of convex risks (1),
and it provides sharp rates of convergence.
We develop our approach to local privacy in the setting of three related privacy measures. The
first is a worst-case measure of mutual information, where we view privacy preservation as a game
between the providers of the data, who wish to preserve privacy, and nature. The second is based on
differential privacy, where the provider of each datum communicates—subject to some constraints
we make explicit later—the most differentially private view Zi of his or her datum Xi. In this
general setting we allow interactivity (i.e., the mapping between Zi and Xi may depend on other
Zj for j 6= i). The third setting is a non-interactive version of local differential privacy.
Turning first to the information-theoretic formulation, and recalling that the method M sees
only the perturbed version Zi of Xi, we use a uniform variant of mutual information I(Zi;Xi)
between the random variables Xi and Zi as a measure for privacy. Using mutual information and
related information-theoretic ideas in the privacy and security context is by no means original; see,
for example, the survey by Liang et al. [34]. It is important to note, however, that standard mutual
information has deficiencies as a measure of privacy (e.g. [19]). Accordingly, our uniform notion of
mutual information is as follows: we say that the distribution Q generating Z from X is private
only if I(X;Z) is small for all possible distributions P on X, possibly subject to some constraints.
In this setting, we design procedures that allow consistent estimation of the parameter θ∗
minimizing R(θ) = EP [ℓ(X, θ)], for any convex loss ℓ and distribution P on the data X. One
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central consequence of our analysis is a sharp characterization of the excess risk,
∆n(θ̂; ℓ,Θ) := E
[
R
(
θ̂(Z1, . . . , Zn)
)]
− inf
θ∈Θ
R(θ), (4)
associated with any estimator θ̂ that satisfies a pre-specified privacy constraint. For particular
collections L of loss functions ℓ ∈ L, we bound the minimax convergence rate of all estimation
procedures. More precisely, let us focus on d-dimensional problems, i.e., those for which the do-
main Θ ⊂ Rd and observations Xi ∈ Rd. If one wishes to uniformly guarantee a level of privacy
I(Xi;Zi) ≤ I∗, then we show that there exists a constant a(L,Θ) ∈ R+—dependent only on the
properties of the collection L and domain Θ—such that for any estimator θ̂ for the family L, the
excess risk is lower bounded as
sup
ℓ∈L
∆n(θ̂; ℓ,Θ) ≥
√
d√
I∗
a(L,Θ)√
n
, (5a)
where a(L,Θ) is a constant characterizing the non-private minimax rate of estimation (see, e.g., Agar-
wal et al. [1] for such constants). Moreover, we also prove that there exists another constant
b(L,Θ) ≥ a(L,Θ) and provide explicit estimators θ̂ with privacy guarantee I∗ such that
sup
ℓ∈L
∆n(θ̂; ℓ,Θ) ≤
√
d√
I∗
b(L,Θ)√
n
. (5b)
Turning to the setting of differential privacy, we are able to show similar results to the bounds (5a)
and (5b). Namely, there exist constants b′(L,Θ) ≥ a′(L,Θ) such that if we wish to guarantee α-
differential privacy, then for any estimator θ̂, the risk is lower bounded by
sup
ℓ∈L
∆n(θ̂; ℓ,Θ) ≥
√
d
α
a′(L,Θ)√
n
, (6a)
while there exist estimators θ̂ such that
sup
ℓ∈L
∆n(θ̂; ℓ,Θ) ≤
√
d
α
b′(L,Θ)√
n
. (6b)
Here again, the constant a′(L,Θ) controls the non-private minimax rate of estimation.
Finally, we show that stochastic gradient descent is one procedure that achieves the above
upper bounds, and moreover, that the ratios b(L,Θ)/a(L,Θ) and b′(L,Θ)/a′(L,Θ) are bounded
above by a universal (numerical) constant. The bounds (5) and (6) thus establish and quantify
explicitly the sharp tradeoff between learning and statistical estimation and the amount of privacy
provided to the population. More concretely, we can evaluate the effective sample size of learning
procedures receiving private observations. In the case of information-based privacy, the sample size
of any learning procedure receiving maximally privatized observations from the data providers is
decreased from n to roughly nI∗/d, while in differentially private settings, we see that the effective
sample size decreases from n to nα2/d. The first of these is perhaps intuitive: in rough terms,
a d-dimensional observation Xi contains about d-bits of information, and so we expect a loss in
(statistical) efficiency by a factor I∗/d. For the second, recent results suggest scalings of I∗ ≈ α2
(e.g. [18, Lemma 3.2]), so the loss n 7→ nα2/d is also perhaps intuitive.
5
Our subsequent analysis will build on this favorable property of gradient-based methods. Indeed,
in the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the communication protocol—except in the non-
interactive α-differentially private case, which allows any protocol—by which data is conveyed to
the learner M is based on (sub)gradients of the loss. As further motivation for this choice, note
that the subgradient (more generally, a score function) of the loss ℓ is asymptotically sufficient in
the sense of Le Cam [32]. A bit more precisely, gradients (in an asymptotic sense) contain all of the
statistical information for risk minimization problems. Secondly, estimation procedures based on
stochastic gradient information are asymptotically efficient [40], in the sense of both Bahadur and
minimax efficiency [45, Chapter 8], and are thus essentially sample optimal; they also have minimax-
optimality guarantees in finite-sample settings [1]. Moreover, many estimation procedures are
gradient-based [36, 6], and distributed optimization procedures that send subgradient information
across a network to a centralized procedureM are natural (e.g. [3]). Our arguments also show that
in many settings, disguising subgradients is equivalent to disguising the data X itself. Thus, as an
additional consequence of our gradient-based focus, our algorithmic bounds also apply in streaming
and online settings, requiring only a fixed-size memory footprint.
1.3 Outline and techniques
We spend the remainder of the paper deriving the bounds (5) and (6). Our route to obtaining
these bounds is based on a two-part analysis. First, we consider saddle points of the mutual
information I(X;Z), when viewed as a function of the distribution P of X and the conditional
distribution Q(· | X) of Z, under natural constraints that still allow estimation. We consider related
saddle points for differentially private conditional distributions. Having computed these saddle
points, we can apply information-theoretic techniques for obtaining lower bounds on estimation
and optimization [49, 1] to prove the results of the form (5a) or (6a). Our upper bounds then
follow by application of known convergence rates for computationally efficient methods, such as
the stochastic gradient and mirror descent algorithms [36, 37]. We provide full proofs—except for
technical results deferred to appendices—and a more complete outline of our technique in Section 5.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We give a precise definition of our notions
of local privacy in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to information-theoretic lower bounds on the
convergence rate of any statistical methodM in terms of the mutual information I∗ between what
the method M observes and each sample Xi. We characterize the unique privacy guaranteeing
distributions in Section 4, which provides a constructive mechanism for trading off privacy and
learning. We present our conclusions in Section 6.
Notation Before continuing, we give our notation and a few standard definitions. The Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between distributions P and Q defined on a set S, where P and Q are
assumed to have densities p and q with respect to a base measure ν1 is given by
Dkl (P‖Q) :=
∫
S
p(s) log
p(s)
q(s)
dν(s).
Similarly, the total-variation distance between the distributions P and Q is defined as
‖P −Q‖TV := sup
A⊂S
|P (A)−Q(A)| = 1
2
∫
S
|p(s)− q(s)|dν(s).
1This is no loss of generality, as P and Q are absolutely continuous with respect to ν = 1
2
(P +Q).
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For a convex function f : Rd → R ∪ {+∞}, the subgradient set ∂f(θ) of f at the point θ is
∂f(θ) :=
{
g ∈ Rd : f(θ′) ≥ f(θ) + g⊤(θ′ − θ), for all θ′ ∈ Rd
}
.
We use ∂ℓ(x, θ) to denote the subgradient set of the function θ 7→ ℓ(x, θ), and for a convex function,
∇ℓ(x, θ) denotes an arbitrary element of ∂ℓ(x, θ). We say that a function f is L-Lipschitz with
respect to the norm ‖·‖ over the set Θ if∣∣f(θ)− f(θ′)∣∣ ≤ L ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
The notation ‖·‖p denotes a standard ℓp-norm. We use the abbreviation r.c.d. throughout for
regular conditional distribution [4]. The extreme points of a set C ⊂ Rd are denoted by Ext(C),
the convex hull of C is denoted by Conv(C), and the support of a distribution P is denoted suppP .
We say values an ≍ bn if limn(an/bn) = 1. The symbol ei denotes the ith standard basis vector in
R
d. Lastly, the symbol ⇒ denotes a set-valued mapping [26].
2 Problem Formulation
We begin with a formal description of the communication protocol by which information about the
random variables X is communicated to the procedure M. We then define the notion of optimal
local privacy studied in this paper and the minimax framework in which we state our main results.
2.1 Communication protocol
In this paper, we focus on statistical learning procedures that have access to data through the
subgradients ∂ℓ(X, θ) of the loss functions. More formally, at each round, the method M is given
access to a random vector Zi such that
E[Zi | Xi, θ] ∈ ∂ℓ(Xi, θ), (7)
where θ ∈ Θ is a parameter chosen by the method. In Appendix A we present an argument that
shows that the unbiasedness of the subgradient inclusion (7) is not only intuitively appealing but
is, in a certain sense, necessary.
In detail, our communication protocol consists of the following three steps:
• the method M sends the parameter vector θ to the owner of the ith sample Xi;
• owner i computes a subgradient vector g ∈ ∂ℓ(Xi, θ) to be communicated privately;
• the vector Zi is communicated to M under the constraint that
E[Zi | Xi, θ] = g ∈ ∂ℓ(Xi, θ).
We assume throughout that there is a compact set C ⊂ Rd such that ∂ℓ(x, θ) ⊆ C for all
pairs (θ, x) ∈ Θ× X . Our goal is “disguise” the subgradient information with a random variable
Z satisfying Z ∈ D, for some compact set D such that C ⊂ intD ⊂ Rd. For instance, a common
choice of these sets are norm balls, say of the form
C = {g ∈ Rd : ‖g‖ ≤ L}, and D = {g ∈ Rd : ‖g‖ ≤M},
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where ‖·‖ is a given norm on Rd, and the radius choice M > L ensures that C ⊂ intD. This choice
covers a variety of online optimization and stochastic approximation algorithms [53, 2, 37, 1], for
which it is assumed that for any x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ, if g ∈ ∂ℓ(x, θ) then ‖g‖ ≤ L for some norm ‖·‖.
We may obtain privacy by allowing perturbation of the subgradient g, which is then required to
live in a (larger) norm ball of radius M > L.
2.2 Optimal local privacy
Suppose that X has distribution P , and for each x ∈ X , let Q(· | x) denote the regular conditional
probability measure of Z given that X = x. This pair defines the marginal distribution Q(·) via
Q(A) = E[Q(A | X)], where the expectation taken with respect to X ∼ P . The mutual information
between X and Z is the expected Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between Q(· | X) and Q(·):
I(P,Q) = I(X;Z) := EP [Dkl (Q(· | X)‖Q(·))] . (8)
We view the problem of privacy as a game between the adversary controlling P and the data owners,
who use Q to obscure the samples X. In particular, we say a distribution Q guarantees a level of
privacy I∗ if and only if supP I(P,Q) ≤ I∗. Note that this guarantee is worst-case, ensuring that
for any choice of distribution P , the publicly available random variable Z provides at most mutual
information I∗ about the sample X.
Our goal is to find a saddle point P ∗, Q∗ such that
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) ≤ I(P ∗, Q∗) ≤ inf
Q
I(P ∗, Q), (9)
where the first supremum is taken over all distributions P on X such that ∇ℓ(X, θ) ∈ C with
P -probability 1, and the infimum is taken over all regular conditional distributions Q such that if
Z ∼ Q(· | X) (meaning that Z is drawn from Q conditional on X), then Z ∈ D and EQ[Z | X, θ] =
∇ℓ(X, θ). Indeed, if we can find P ∗ and Q∗ satisfying the saddle point (9), then combination with
the trivial direction of the max-min inequality yields
sup
P
inf
Q
I(P,Q) = I(P ∗, Q∗) = inf
Q
sup
P
I(P,Q).
To fully formalize this idea and our notions of privacy, we define two collections of probability
measures and associated losses. For sets C ⊂ D ⊂ Rd, we define the source set
P (C) := {Distributions P such that suppP ⊂ C} (10a)
and the set of communicating distributions as the following regular conditional distributions (r.c.d.’s):
Q (C,D) :=
{
r.c.d.’s Q s.t. suppQ(· | c) ⊂ D and
∫
D
zdQ(z | c) = c for c ∈ C
}
. (10b)
The definitions (10a) and (10b) formally define the sets over which we may take infima and suprema
in the saddle point calculations, and they capture what may be communicated. The conditional
distributions Q ∈ Q (C,D) are defined so that for any loss ℓ with ∇ℓ(x, θ) ∈ C, we have
EQ[Z | X = x, θ] :=
∫
D
zdQ (z | ∇ℓ(x, θ)) = ∇ℓ(x, θ).
We now make the following key definition:
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Definition 1. The conditional distributionQ∗ satisfies optimal local privacy for the sets C ⊂ D ⊂ Rd
if
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) = inf
Q
sup
P
I(P,Q)
where the supremum is taken over distributions P ∈ P (C) and the infimum is taken over regular
conditional distributions Q ∈ Q (C,D). We say Q∗ satisfies optimal local privacy at level I∗ if in
addition supP I(P,Q
∗) = I∗.
We also formulate a corresponding notion of local optimality in the differentially private setting.
For given sets C ⊂ D, define the differential privacy measure
α⋆(C,D) := inf
Q
log
[
sup
S∈σ(D)
sup
x,x′∈C
Q(S | X = x)
Q(S | X = x′)
]
, (11)
where the infimum is taken over all regular conditional distributions Q ∈ Q (C,D) such that
EQ[Z | X = x] = x. We define optimal local differential privacy as follows:
Definition 2. The conditional distribution Q∗ satisfies optimal local differential privacy for the
sets C ⊂ D ⊂ Rd if Q∗ ∈ Q (C,D) and
1. The distribution Q∗ is α⋆(C,D)-differentially private.
2. We have supP I(P,Q
∗) ≤ supP I(P,Q), for all α⋆(C,D)-differentially private Q ∈ Q (C,D),
where the supremum is taken over all distributions P ∈ P (C).
If a distribution Q∗ satisfies optimal local privacy or optimal local differential privacy, then it
guarantees that even for the worst possible distribution on X, the information communicated about
X is limited. (Part of our results consist in showing that for suitable sets C ⊂ D, it is possible
to attain α⋆(C,D), so it is sensible to, in addition, choose the distribution that minimizes mutual
information.)
In a sense, Definitions 1 and 2 capture the natural competition between privacy and learnability.
The methodM specifies the set D to which the data Z it receives must belong; the “teachers,” or
owners of the data X, choose the distribution Q to guarantee as much privacy as possible subject to
this constraint. Using these mechanisms, if we can characterize a unique distribution Q∗ attaining
the infimum (9) for P ∗ (and by extension, for any P ), then we may study the effects of requiring a
bounded amount of information to be communicated to the method M about X, which we do in
Section 3.
2.3 Minimax error
Given an estimate θ̂ based on n samples X from a distribution P , we assess its quality in terms of
the risk function (1), i.e. R(θ) = E[ℓ(X, θ)]. In this section, we describe the minimax framework for
obtaining bounds uniformly over all possible estimators. Let M denote any statistical procedure
or method that operates on stochastic gradient samples, and let θ̂n denote the output of M after
receiving n such samples. The excess risk of the method M on the risk R(θ) after receiving n
sample gradients is
ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P ) := R(θ̂n)− inf
θ∈Θ
R(θ) = EP [ℓ(X, θ̂n)]− inf
θ∈Θ
EP [ℓ(X, θ)]. (12)
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The excess risk is a random variable, since the output θ̂n of the method is random.
In our settings, in addition to the randomness in the sampling distribution P , there is additional
randomness from the perturbation applied to stochastic gradients of the objective ℓ(X, ·) to mask
X from the statistitician or method M. Let Q denote the regular conditional probability—the
channel distribution—whose conditional part is defined on the range of the (set-valued) subgradient
mapping ∂ℓ(X, ·) : Θ⇒ Rd. Since the output θ̂n of the statistical procedureM is a random function
of both P and Q, we take the expectation and measure the expected sub-optimality of the risk
according to P and Q. We let L denote a collection of loss functions, where for a distribution P
on X , the set L(P ) denotes the losses ℓ : suppP ×Θ→ R+ belonging to L. The minimax error is
then given by
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) := inf
M
sup
P
sup
ℓ∈L(P )
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )], (13)
where the expectation is taken over the random samples X ∼ P and Z ∼ Q(· | X, θ). In this
paper, we provide characterizations of the minimax error (13) for several classes of loss functions
L(P ), giving sharp results when the privacy distribution Q satisfies optimal local privacy for any
loss function ℓ ∈ L(P ) and distribution P .
3 Optimal Learning Rates and Tradeoffs
With the basic framework in place, we now turn to statements of our main results. We begin
by imposing certain (weak) conditions on the families of loss functions that we consider, and
subsequently turn to the main results of this section (Theorems 1 and 2, which apply to information-
based privacy, and Theorems 3–5, which apply to α-differential privacy) as well as some of their
consequences (Corollaries 1, 2, and 3). After describing the optimal privacy-preserving distributions
in Section 4, we provide proofs of the results in this section in Section 5.
3.1 Families of loss functions and stochastic gradient methods
We assume that our collection of loss functions obey certain natural smoothness conditions. For
each p ∈ [1,∞], we use ‖·‖p to denote the usual ℓp-norm, and we use q = pp−1 to denote the
conjugate exponent satisfying the relation 1/p+1/q = 1. With this notation, we have the following
definition:
Definition 3. For parameters L > 0 and p ≥ 1, an (L, p)-loss function is a measurable function
ℓ : X ×Θ→ R such that for x ∈ X , the function θ 7→ ℓ(x, θ) is convex and L-Lipschitz continuous
with respect to the norm ‖·‖q.
A convex loss ℓ satisfies Definition 3 if and only if for all θ ∈ Θ, we have the inequality ‖g‖p ≤ L
for any subgradient g ∈ ∂ℓ(x, θ) (e.g. [26]).
To illustrate this definition, let us consider a few examples:
Example 1. Consider the problem of finding a multi-dimensional median, in which case each
sample x ∈ Rd, and the loss function takes the form
ℓ(x, θ) = L ‖θ − x‖1 .
This loss is L-Lipschitz with respect to the ℓ1-norm, subgradients belonging to [−L,L]d, and hence
it belongs to the class of (L,∞)-loss functions.
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Example 2 (Classification). We may also consider classification based on either the hinge loss or
logistic regression loss. In this setting, the data comes in pairs x = (a, b), where a ∈ Rd is the set
of regressors or predictors and b ∈ {−1, 1} is the label; the losses are
ℓ(x, θ) = [1− b 〈a, θ〉]+ and ℓ(x, θ) = log (1 + exp(−b 〈a, θ〉)) .
By computing (sub)gradients, we may verify that each of these is an (L, p)-loss if and only if the
covariate vector a ∈ Rd satisfies ‖a‖p ≤ L, which is a common assumption [7, 42].
Definition 3 is natural given the communication strategy we outline in Section 2.1. Since our
loss functions satisfy ‖∂ℓ(X, θ)‖ ≤ L, the channel distribution Q amounts to perturbing subgradi-
ents to larger norm balls while maintaining the appropriate expectations.
Before proceeding, we briefly review standard algorithms for solving problems of the forms
outlined above, since they are essential to our results: for each of our main results, the optimal
convergence rate is attained by (a variant of) mirror descent [36, 2, 37], which is a non-Euclidean
generalization of the stochastic gradient method [36, 40, 53]. Stochastic gradient methods are
iterative methods that update a parameter θt over iterations t of an algorithm using stochastic
gradient information. At iteration t, the algorithm receives a vector gt ∈ Rd with conditional
expectation E[gt | θt] ∈ ∂R(θt), then performs the update
θt+1 = argmin
θ∈Θ
{
η 〈gt, θ〉+Ψ(θ, θt)
}
.
Here η is a step-size and Ψ is a Bregman divergence, which keeps θt+1 relatively close to θt. (See
the papers [2, 37] for further details.) With appropriate choice of Ψ, the mirror descent algorithm
enjoys the following convergence guarantees. Define θ̂n =
1
n
∑n
t=1 θ
t. If E[‖gt‖2∞ | θt] ≤M2∞ for all
t and Θ is contained in the ℓ1-ball of radius r1, then with appropriate choice of Ψ and η
E[R(θ̂n)]−R(θ∗) = O
(
M∞r1
√
log d√
n
)
. (14a)
See, for example, Beck and Teboulle [2, Section 5] or Nemirovski et al. [37, Section 2.3]. Similarly,
with the choice Ψ(θ, θ′) = ‖θ − θ′‖22, if E[‖gt‖22 | θt] ≤M22 and Θ is contained in the ℓ2-ball of radius
r2, then
E[R(θ̂n)]−R(θ∗) = O
(
M2r2√
n
)
. (14b)
For instance, see the references [53, 37] for results of this type.
3.2 Minimax error bounds under privacy
We now state our main theorems, and discuss some of their consequences. All proofs are deferred
to Section 5.
3.2.1 Minimax errors with mutual information-based privacy
Our first two main results consider privacy mechanisms Q satisfying optimal local privacy, Defini-
tion 1. We state the theorems first focusing on their dependence on the geometry of the subdiffer-
ential sets (in which the subgradients live); in the corollaries to follow we show how these choices
correspond to particular mutual information guarantees on privacy.
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Our first theorem applies to the class of (L,∞) loss functions as given in Definition 3. For
this theorem, we assume that the set to which the perturbed data Z must belong is [−M∞,M∞]d,
where M∞ ≥ L. In the notation of Definition 1, this corresponds to taking C = [−L,L]d and
D = [−M∞,M∞]d. We state two variants of the first theorem, as one version gives slightly sharper
results for an important special case.
Theorem 1. Let L be the collection of (L,∞) loss functions, assume the conditions of the preceding
paragraph, and let Q be optimally locally private (Definition 1) for L. Then
(a) If Θ contains the ℓ∞ ball of radius r, then
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≥
1
20
min
{
rLd,
M∞rd
9
√
n
}
.
(b) If Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ r}, then
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≥
1
8
min
{
rL,
M∞ r
√
log(2d)
2
√
n
}
.
Our second main theorem applies to loss functions and objectives with a different geometry.
Now we assume that the loss functions L consist of (L, 1) losses, and that the perturbed data must
belong to the ℓ1 ball of radius M1, i.e., Z ∈ {z ∈ Rd : ‖z‖1 ≤ M1}. Thus in the notation of
Definition 1, we have D = (M1/L)C, where C = {g ∈ Rd : ‖g‖1 ≤ L}. If we define M =M1/L, we
may define the constants
γ := log
(
2d− 2 +
√
(2d− 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1)
)
and ∆(γ) :=
eγ − e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2(d− 1) , (15)
which are related to the unique distribution achieving optimal local privacy for the (L, 1) losses
and the larger ℓ1-ball above (see equation (20) and Proposition 2). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let L be the collection of (L, 1) loss functions, assume the conditions of the preceding
paragraph, and let Q be optimally private for the collection L. If Θ contains the ℓ∞-ball of radius r,
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≥
1
20
min
{
rL,
rL
√
d
9
√
n∆(γ)
}
.
Remarks We make a few remarks on Theorems 1 and 2. First, we note that, when reduced to
the special case of having no random distribution Q, Theorems 1 and 2 each yield a minimax rate
for stochastic optimization problems. Indeed, in Theorem 1, we may take M∞ = L, in which case
(focusing on the second statement of the theorem) we obtain that for Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ r},
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≥
rL
16
√
log(2d)
n
.
Mirror descent algorithms [36, 37] can be used to minimize this class of loss functions, and their
convergence rate matches this lower bound up to constant factors (also see our results in the sequel,
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as well as the explanation of Agarwal et al. [1]). When specialized to this setting our result is thus
unimprovable. Moreover, our analysis is sharper than previous analyses: none of the existing lower
bounds recover the logarithmic dependence on the dimension d, which is evidently necessary.
Our second remark is that while our results appear to require disguising only gradient infor-
mation, based on our communication formulation in Section 2.1, this restriction is not actually
substantial. Indeed, when the domain Θ is a norm ball we can establish each of our lower bounds
using the loss function ℓ(x, θ) = 〈x, θ〉. In this case, ∇ℓ(x, θ) = x, so that the communication
scheme explicitly disguises exactly the individual data Xi.
We now turn to some consequences of Theorems 1 and 2, where we exhibit the tradeoffs between
rates of convergence for any statistical procedure and the desired privacy of a user. We present two
corollaries that characterize this tradeoff. Looking ahead to Section 4, we may use Propositions 1
and 2 in that section to derive a bijection between the sizesM∞ andM1 of the perturbation sets and
the amount of privacy as measured by the worst case mutual information I∗. We can then combine
the lower bounds of Theorems 1 and 2 with results on stochastic approximation (the mirror descent
convergence rates (14)) to obtain the following tradeoffs. We provide the full proofs in Sections 5.7
and 5.8, respectively.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 1(b), assume moreover that M∞ ≥ 2L, and that
Q∗ satisfies optimal local privacy at information level I∗ in the sense of Definition 1. Then for
universal constants 0 < cℓ ≤ cu <∞, the minimax error is sandwiched as
cℓ
√
d√
I∗
· rL
√
log(2d)√
n
≤ ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≤ cu
√
d√
I∗
· rL
√
log(2d)√
n
.
Similar upper and lower bounds can be obtained under the conditions of part (a) of Theorem 1,
again by using mirror descent, but we lose a factor of
√
log d in the lower bound. (There is an
additional factor of d in the statement (a), and Θ ⊇ {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖∞ ≤ r/d}.) In this case we would
not need to assume that Θ is an ℓ1-ball for the lower bound.
We now turn to an analogous result based on an application of Theorem 2 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, assume that M1 ≥ 2L and Q∗ satisfies optimal
local privacy at information level I∗. Moreover, suppose that Θ contains an ℓ∞-ball of radius c1r
and is contained in an ℓ∞-ball of radius c2r, where 0 < c1 ≤ c2 are constants. Then for universal
constants 0 < cℓ ≤ cu <∞, the minimax error is sandwiched as
cℓ
√
d√
I∗
· rL
√
d√
n
≤ ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≤ cu
√
d√
I∗
· rL
√
d√
n
.
As a final remark, we have stated results that depend on specific geometric properties of the
loss functions L. While these geometric properties are natural, as illustrated by the example
Section 3.1, it is also possible to use our techniques to derive alternative results. Such extensions
require computing the optimal distribution attaining local privacy according to Definitions 1 or 2,
then applying the lower-bounding techniques to developed in Section 5.
3.2.2 Minimax errors under differential privacy
We now turn to the setting of differentially private algorithms. We focus on two settings for
differential privacy: in the first (Theorem 3), we assume that communication respects optimal local
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differential privacy, as given by Definition 2. For the second two results, Theorems 4 and 5, we
change the setting slightly, assuming only that the mechanism by which the private quantity Zi is
communicated to the method M is α-differentially private and non-interactive (recall Eq. (3)).
Optimal local differential privacy We begin with the result assuming optimal local differential
privacy. We use the same collection of loss functions L as in Theorem 1, that is, (L,∞)-loss
functions. We also assume that the set to which the perturbed data Z belong is [−M∞,M∞]d,
though the specific value of M∞ is not important for the statement of the theorem.
Theorem 3. Let L be the collection of (L,∞) loss functions, and assume that Z is optimally locally
differentially private (Definition 2), attaining α-differential privacy for the set L. Let d ≥ 2 and
assume α ≤ 5/4. Then
ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≥
1
8
min
{
rL,
√
d
α
rL
√
log(2d)
4
√
n
}
.
As a corollary to this result, we can show an upper bound on the necessary magnitude of the
gradient bound M∞ to allow α-differential privacy, again applying the mirror descent result (14a).
See Section 5.9 for a proof.
Corollary 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 3, assume that Q∗ satisfies Definition 2, attaining
α-differential privacy. Then for universal constants 0 < cℓ ≤ cu, the minimax error is sandwiched
as
cℓ
√
d
α
· rL
√
log(2d)√
n
≤ ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≤ cu
√
d
α
· rL
√
log(2d)√
n
.
Non-interactive local differential privacy We turn to our two results under non-interactive
differential privacy, where we no longer assume that the channel is optimally private (the data
provider simply guarantees α-differential privacy). In this setting, we give a minor refinement
of the definition of minimax error (13). We let Qα denote the family of α-differentially private
distributions where the channel Q is α-differentially private and non-interactive, meaning that the
private variable Zi is conditionally independent of Zj for j 6= i given Xi; recall the definition (3).
With this, the minimax error is defined as
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) := inf
M,Q∈Qα
sup
P
sup
ℓ∈L(P )
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )],
where now the infimum is taken over all α-private, non-interactive local mechanisms Q, as well as
all methods M. Thus, the channel Q and M work together to find the best possible estimator,
subject to the differential privacy constraint.
Our first lower bound applies to a class of functions that are Lipschitz with respect to the ℓ1-
norm, where the optimization takes place over the ball B1(r) := {θ ∈ Rd | ‖θ‖1 ≤ r}. We define the
set L(B1(r);L) to be the collection of convex (L,∞)-loss functions defined on B1(r). By Example 1,
this loss class covers the problem of the multi-dimensional median. In stating our minimax bounds,
we use a more restrictive (i.e., simpler to optimize) class, the collection of (L,∞)-linear losses:
Llin(L,∞) :=
{
ℓ : X × Rd → R | ∃ φ : X → Rd s.t. ℓ(x, θ) = 〈φ(x), θ〉 , sup
x
‖φ(x)‖∞ ≤ L
}
.
For this class, we have the following minimax rate (see Section 5.5 for a proof):
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Theorem 4. For the loss class L = Llin(L,∞) and privacy parameter α = O(1), assuming that
the channel Q is non-interactive and α-differentially private, there are universal constants 0 < cℓ ≤
cu <∞ such that
cℓmin
{√
d
α
rL
√
log(2d)√
n
, rL
}
≤ ǫ∗n(L,B1(r), α) ≤ cumin
{√
d
α
rL
√
log(2d)√
n
, rL
}
. (16)
We can also give a result for a larger class of domains and related optimization functions. In
particular, consider the loss class
L(Θ;L, p) := {ℓ : X ×Θ→ R | ℓ is a convex (L, p)-loss function}, (17)
for some p ∈ [1, 2]. Restricting the set (17) to the smaller collection of linear functionals, we define
Llin(Θ;L, p) :=
{
ℓ : X ×Θ→ R | ∃ φ : X → Rd s.t. ℓ(x, θ) = 〈φ(x), θ〉 , sup
x
‖φ(x)‖p ≤ L
}
.
We then have the following result, which captures rates of convergence for optimization of linear
functionals over ℓq-norm balls of the form
Bq(rq) := {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖q ≤ rq}, where q ∈ [2,∞].
Theorem 5. For the loss class L = Llin(Bq(rq);L, p) with q ∈ [2,∞] and non-interactive α-
differentially private channel Q with α = O(1), there exist universal constants 0 < cℓ ≤ cu < ∞
such that
cℓ rqLmin
{√
d
α
d
1
2
− 1
q
√
n
, (
√
nα2)
− 1
q , 1
}
≤ ǫ∗n(L,Bq(rq), α) ≤ cu rqLmin
{√
d
α
d
1
2
− 1
q
√
n
, 1
}
. (18)
For the loss class L = L(Θ;L, p) from Eq. (17), if Θ ⊃ Bq(rq), there exists a universal (numerical)
constant 0 < cℓ such that
cℓmin
{√
d
α
rqLd
1
2
− 1
q
√
n
, rqL
}
≤ ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α). (19)
See Section 5.6 for a proof.
Remarks Each of our theorems and corollaries provide sharp characterizations of the minimax
rate of estimation up to the constant factors (cℓ, cu). As noted in the previous section, the non-
private minimax rate for the class L(B1(r);L) is rL
√
log(2d)/
√
n. We may compare this with the
rate in Theorems 3 and 4, as well as Corollary 3. We see that α-local differential privacy has a
dimension-dependent effect on the minimax rate: the effective sample size is reduced from n to
α2n/d. This is a substantial reduction, as instead of a logarithmic dependence on the dimension
d—which one hopes for in high-dimensional settings such as those specified by the theorem—we
have a linear dependence, which is unavoidable under the conditions of the theorems.
In Theorem 5 as well, the inequalities (18) provide a characterization of the α-private minimax
rate that is tight up to constant factors. Again, it is worthwhile to relate this minimax rate to the
non-private setting: from Theorem 1 and Eq. (11) of Agarwal et al. [1], the non-private minimax
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rate for the function class Llin(Θ;L, p) is lower bounded by rqLd
1
2
− 1
q /
√
n. Consequently, the price
for α-privacy is again a reduction in effective sample size by the dimension-dependent factor α2/d.
In general, stochastic gradient descent methods require interactivity—they iteratively process
the data and query for gradients at points θ depending on the data observed—except in linear
settings. We do, however, obtain matching upper bounds for the general convex case in both
Theorems 4 and 5 using stochastic gradient methods (which is unsurprising, as the linear setting is,
in a sense, the hardest [36, 1]). This leads to the intriguing open question of whether interactivity
can sharpen the results of Theorems 4 and 5. (For Theorems 1–3, the optimal privacy game played
by the data providers allows interactivity, and hence the results cannot be improved.) It is also
interesting to note that in Theorems 3–5, in the α-differentially private setting, adding Laplace
noise—the most common mechanism for achieving privacy [15]—appears to be substantially sub-
optimal: the magnitude of noise necessary to privatize the user’s data is Ω(d) larger than that
provided by the optimal sampling mechanisms we develop in the sequel.
Summarizing, each of the preceding results indicates that—no matter the type of privacy—
there is a dimension-dependent increase in sample complexity. From Corollaries 1 and 2 we see
that incorporating privacy induces a penalty of roughly
√
d/
√
I∗ in convergence rate, or an effective
sample size reduction from n to nI∗/d; in the differential privacy case we have n 7→ nα2/d. While
we do not know of an explicit comparison between these two bounds, work by Dwork et al. [18,
Lemma 3.2] shows that KL divergence between α-differentially private distributions scales as α2,
which implies roughly that I∗ ≈ α2 (though this is informal). We see roughly similar results,
though there does not appear to be a simple mapping between information-theoretic notions of
privacy and differential privacy.
4 Optimal privacy-preserving distributions
In this section, we explore conditions for a distribution Q∗ to satisfy optimal local privacy as given
by Definitions 1 and 2. We give a few characterizations of necessary (and sometimes sufficient)
conditions based on the compact sets C ⊂ D for distributions P ∗ and Q∗ to achieve the saddle
point (9). Our results can be viewed as rate distortion theorems [23, 8, 10] (with source P and
channel Q) for certain compact alphabets, though as far as we know, they are all new. Thus,
we refer to the conditional distribution Q, which is designed to maintain the privacy of the data
X by communication of Z, interchangeably as the privacy-preserving distribution or the channel
distribution.
Note that since we wish to bound I(X;Z) for general losses ℓ, as captured in the definitions
of the source P (C) and communication set Q (C,D) in Eqs. (10a) and (10b), we must address
the case when ℓ(X, θ) = 〈θ,X〉, in which case ∇ℓ(X, θ) = X; this shows (by the data-processing
inequality [23, Chapter 5]) that it is no loss of generality to assume that X ∈ C with probability
1 and that we must have E[Z | X] = X. Thus we present each of our results assuming that
ℓ(X, θ) = 〈θ,X〉, since a distribution Q∗ is optimally locally private or optimally differentially
locally private if and only if it attains the saddle point with this choice of loss.
4.1 General saddle point characterizations
We begin with a general characterization, first defining the types of sets C and D that we use in
our characterization of privacy. Such sets are reasonable for many applications (recall Section 3.1).
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We focus on the case when the compact sets C and D are (suitably symmetric) norm balls:
Definition 4. Let C ⊂ Rd be a compact convex set with extreme points ui ∈ Rd, i ∈ I for some
index set I. Then C is a rotationally invariant through its extreme points if ‖ui‖2 = ‖uj‖2 for each
i, j, and for any unitary matrix U such that Uui = uj for some i 6= j, then UC = C.
Some examples of convex sets rotationally invariant through their extreme points include ℓp-norm
balls for p = 1, 2,∞, though ℓp-balls for p 6∈ {1, 2,∞} are not.
The following theorem gives a general characterization of the minimax mutual information for
such rotationally invariant sets by providing saddle point distributions P ∗ and Q∗. We provide the
proof of Theorem 6 in Section E.1.
Theorem 6. Let C be a compact convex polytope rotationally invariant through its m <∞ extreme
points {ui}mi=1 and D = (1 + κ)C for some κ > 0. Let Q∗ be the conditional distribution of Z | X
that maximizes the entropy H(Z | X = x) subject to the constraints that
EQ[Z | X = x] = x
for x ∈ C and that Z is supported on (1 + κ)ui for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then Q∗ satisfies Definition 1,
optimal local privacy, and Q∗ is (up to measure zero sets) unique. Moreover, the distribution P ∗
that is uniform on {ui}mi=1 attains the saddle point (9).
Remarks: We make a few brief remarks here, deferring a somewhat deeper discussion of the
implications of Theorem 6 to Appendix E.1, as an understanding of the proof helps. The theorem
requires that for Q∗ to attain the saddle point guaranteeing optimal local privacy, Q∗(· | X = x)
should maximize the entropy of Z for each x ∈ C, but this is not essential. If x 6∈ {ui}mi=1, a two-
phase approach still obtains optimal local privacy. We construct a Markov chain X → X ′ → Z,
where X ′ is supported on the extreme points {ui}mi=1 of C. The distribution X → X ′ may then
be any distribution satisfying E[X ′ | X] = X; we then take the conditional distribution Q∗(· | ui)
defined for X ′ → Z to be the maximum entropy distribution Q∗(· | ui) defined in the theorem. By
the data processing inequality [23, Chapter 5], this Markov chain X → X ′ → Z guarantees the
minimax information bound I(X;Z) ≤ infQ supP I(P,Q).
4.2 Specific saddle point computations
With Theorem 6 in place, we can explicitly characterize the minimax mutual information for ℓ1
and ℓ∞ balls by computing maximum entropy distributions. That is, we compute the unique
distributions that attain optimal local privacy—the distributions that guarantee as much (of our
definition of) privacy as possible subject to certain constraints. We present two propositions in this
regard, providing some discussion and giving proofs in Sections E.2 and E.3.
First, consider the case where X ∈ [−L,L]d and Z ∈ [−M,M ]d, where M ≥ L. For notational
convenience, we define the binary entropy h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). We have
Proposition 1. For constants M ≥ L > 0, let X ∈ [−L,L]d and Z ∈ [−M,M ]d be random
variables such that E[Z | X] = X almost surely. Define Q∗ to be the conditional distribution on
Z | X such that the coordinates of Z are independent, have range {−M,M}, and satisfy
Q∗(Zi =M | X) = 1
2
+
Xi
2M
and Q∗(Zi = −M | X) = 1
2
− Xi
2M
.
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Then Q∗ satisfies Definition 1, optimal local privacy, and moreover,
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) = d− d · h
(
1
2
+
L
2M
)
.
Before continuing, we give a slightly more intuitive understanding of Proposition 1. Let L = 1
for simplicity (this is no loss of generality by scaling). Concavity implies that for a, b > 0, log(a) ≤
log b+ b−1(a− b), or − log(a) ≥ − log(b) + b−1(b− a), so
− log
(
1
2
− 1
2M
)
≥ − log 1
2
+ 2 · 1
2M
and − log
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)
≥ − log 1
2
− 2 · 1
2M
.
In particular, we see that
h
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)
≥ −
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)(
− log 2− 1
M
)
−
(
1
2
− 1
2M
)(
− log 2 + 1
M
)
= log 2− 1
M2
.
That is, we have for any distribution P on X, where X ∈ [−L,L]d, that (in natural logarithms)
I(P,Q∗) ≤ dL
2
M2
,
and this bound is tight to O((M/L)−3).
We now consider the case when X ∈ {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1} and Z ∈ {z ∈ Rd : ‖z‖1 ≤M}. Here
the arguments are slightly more complicated, as the coordinates of the random variables are no
longer independent, but Theorem 6 still allows us to explicitly characterize the saddle point of the
mutual information. Before stating the proposition, we recall that if ei ∈ Rd are the standard basis
vectors, then the extreme points of the ℓ1-ball of radius 1 are the 2d vectors {±ei}di=1.
Proposition 2. For a constant M > 1, let X ∈ {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1} and Z ∈ {z ∈ Rd : ‖z‖1 ≤M}
be random variables. Define the parameter
γ := log
(
2d− 2 +
√
(2d− 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1)
)
, (20)
and let Q∗ be the conditional distribution on Z | X such that Z is supported on {±Mei}di=1, and
Q∗(Z =Mei | X = ei) = e
γ
eγ + e−γ + (2d− 2) , (21a)
Q∗(Z = −Mei | X = ei) = e
−γ
eγ + e−γ + (2d− 2) , (21b)
Q∗(Z = ±Mej | X = ei, j 6= i) = 1
eγ + e−γ + (2d− 2) . (21c)
(For X 6∈ {±ei}, define X ′ to be randomly selected in any way from among {±ei} such that
E[X ′ | X] = X, then sample Z from X ′ according to (21a)–(21c).) Then Q∗ satisfies Definition 1,
optimal local privacy, and
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) = log(2d)− log (eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2)+ γ eγ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2 − γ
e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2 .
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By scaling, if we have X ∈ {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ L} and Z ∈ {z ∈ Rd : ‖Z‖1 ≤M1}, then the theorem
holds with M =M1/L in Eq. (20) and with X = ei replaced by X = Lei in Eq. (21).
Proposition 2 is somewhat more complex than the ℓ∞ case. We remark that the additional
sampling to guarantee that X ′ ∈ {±ei} (where the conditional distribution Q∗ is defined) can
be accomplished simply: define the random variable X ′ so that X ′ = ei sign(xi) with probability
|xi|/ ‖x‖1. Evidently E[X ′ | X] = x, and X → X ′ → Z for Z distributed according to Q∗ defines a
Markov chain as in our remarks following Theorem 6. An asymptotic expansion allows us to gain
a somewhat clearer picture of the values of the mutual information, though we do not derive upper
bounds as we did for Proposition 1. We have the following corollary, proved in Appendix E.5.
Corollary 4. Let Q∗ denote the conditional distribution in Proposition 2, where X and Z lie in
ℓ1-balls of radii L and M , respectively. Then
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) =
dL2
2M2
+Θ
(
min
{
d3L4
M4
,
log4(d)
d
})
.
4.3 Saddle points for differentially private communication
Our final result in this section characterizes saddle points for distributions satisfying Definition 2.
Such calculations are, in general, non-trivial, so we restrict our attention to results necessary for
the setting of Theorem 3. To that end, we focus on the case where C and D are ℓ∞ balls, which is
relevant for high-dimensional statistical and optimization settings. Without loss of generality (by
scaling), we may take C = [−1, 1]d and D = [−M,M ]d. We have
Proposition 3. For a constant M ≥ 1, let X ∈ [−1, 1]d and Z ∈ [−M,M ]d be random variables
such that E[Z | X] = X almost surely. Fix any x ∈ {−1, 1}d and for k = {0, 2, 4, . . . , 2 ⌈d/2⌉ − 2}
define the constants q+k ≥ 0 and q−k ≥ 0 to satisfy the linear equations
Mq+k
∑
z∈{−1,1}d:〈z,x〉>k
z +Mq−k
∑
z∈{−1,1}d:〈z,x〉≤k
z = x and q+k + q
−
k = 1.
Set k∗ ∈ argmink{q+k /q−k }. The optimal differential privacy (11) for the sets C = [−1, 1]d and
D = [−M,M ]d is
α⋆(C,D) = log
q+k∗
q−k∗
= min
k∈{0,2,...,2⌈d/2⌉−2}
log
q+k
q−k
.
The distributions attaining optimal local differential privacy are characterized as follows. Define
Q∗k to be the distribution supported on {−M,M}d with probability mass function defined by
Q∗k(Z =Mz | X = x) =
{
q+k if 〈z, x〉 > k
q−k if 〈z, x〉 ≤ k
(22)
for z, x ∈ {−1, 1}d. (For X 6∈ {−1, 1}d, define X ′ to be randomly chosen from {−1, 1}d such that
E[X ′ | X] = X, then sample Z according to the above p.m.f.) A distribution Q∗ satisfies Defini-
tion 2, optimal local differential privacy, if and only if it can be written as a convex combination of
those Q∗k for which k ∈ argmink{q+k , q−k }, that is,
Q∗ =
∑
k∈argmink{q
+
k
,q−
k
}
βkQ
∗
k, where βk ≥ 0 and
∑
k∈argmink{q
+
k
,q−
k
}
βk = 1.
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The proof of Proposition 3 is technical, and we defer it to Section E.4. We make a few remarks,
however. First, we provide a simplified explanation of the linear equations in the proposition.
By symmetry, no matter the value of x ∈ {−1, 1}d chosen, the same q+k and q−k solve the linear
equations. Proposition 3 shows the structure of the distribution attaining optimal local differential
privacy. That is, the proposition shows that the distribution Q∗(· | x) assigns mass only on the
points z ∈ {−M,M}d, and moreover, it assigns one of two masses: either q+ or q−. To sample from
this distribution given an initial point x, one simply flips a coin with bias probabilities {q+k , q−k },
and depending on the result of the coint flip, samples Z ∈ {−M,M}d uniformly from one of the
sets {z : 〈z, x〉 > k/M} or {z : 〈z, x〉 ≤ k/M}.
5 Proofs of Statistical Rates
In this section, we prove Theorems 1–5 as well as Corollaries 1, 2, and 3. Our proofs are based on
classical information-theoretic techniques from statistical minimax theory [49, 50], and also exploit
some additional results due to Agarwal et al. [1]. At a high level, our approach consists of the
following steps. Beginning with an appropriately chosen finite set V, we assign a risk function Rv
to each member v ∈ V. The resulting collection {Rv}v∈V of risk functions is chosen so that they
“separate” points in the set V, meaning that if θ ∈ Θ is a point that approximately minimizes
the function Rv, then for any w 6= v, the point θ cannot also be an approximate minimizer of
Rw. This separation property allows us to deduce that statistical estimation implies the existence
of a testing procedure that distinguishes v from w for w 6= v. We then use lower bounds on the
error probability in tests, such asFano’s and Le Cam’s inequalities [50], to obtain a lower bound
on the testing error. These inequalities depend on the mutual information between the random
variable Xi and the vector Zi communicated, so the final step is to obtain good upper bounds on
this mutual information. In the next section, we describe in more detail this reduction, finishing
with an outline of the proofs to follow.
5.1 Reduction to testing
We begin by describing the reduction that lower bounds the minimax error by the error of a
testing problem. It assumes a given collection of risk functions {Rv}v∈V indexed by a finite set
V; see the individual theorem proofs to follow for constructions of the particular collections used
in our analysis. For each v ∈ V, we choose some representative θ∗v ∈ argminθ∈ΘRv(θ) of the set
of all minimizing vectors. Our reduction is based on a discrepancy measure between pairs of risk
functions, first introduced by Agarwal et al. [1], defined as
ρ(Rv, Rw) := inf
θ∈Θ
[Rv(θ) +Rw(θ)−Rv(θ∗v)−Rw(θ∗w)] .
The ρ-separation of the set V is defined as
ρ⋆(V) := min {ρ(Rv, Rw) : v,w ∈ V, v 6= w} . (23)
When the set V is clear from context, we use ρ⋆ as shorthand for this separation.
The key to the definition (23) is that the separation allows us to lower bound the expected
optimality gap of a statistical method M by the probability of error in a hypothesis test. That is,
with the family {Rv}v∈V , we can define the canonical hypothesis testing problem: nature chooses
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a uniformly random V ∈ V, and conditional on V = v, the n observations Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are
drawn independently from a distribution Pv satisfying Rv(θ) = EPv [ℓ(X, θ)]. In the private setting,
instead of observing Xi, the learner observes the privatized vector Zi, and given the set {Zi}ni=1,
the goal is to determine the underlying index v.
Recall the definition (12) of the excess risk ǫn. The previously described hypothesis testing
problem can be used to establish lower bounds on the estimation error, as demonstrated in the
following:
Lemma 1. Let P be a joint distribution over X ∈ Rd and V ∈ V such that X are i.i.d. given V
and
EP [ℓ(X, θ) | V = v] = Rv(θ).
Let Q be the conditional distribution of Z given the observations X. Then for any minimization
procedure M, there exists a hypothesis test v̂M : (Z1, . . . , Zn)→ V such that
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ ρ
⋆(V)
2
PP,Q [v̂M(Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= V ] .
This result is a variant of Lemma 2 due to Agarwal et al. [1]) It shows that if we can bound the
probability of error of any hypothesis test for identifying V based on the sample Z1, . . . , Zn, we
have lower bounded the rate at which it is possible to minimize the risk R.
The remaining challenge is to provide a lower bound on the error of hypothesis testing problems.
To do so, we apply one of two well-known inequalities: Fano’s inequality [8], which applies when
|V| > 2, or Le Cam’s method [33, 50], which we apply when |V| = 2. Let V ∈ V be chosen uniformly
at random from V. If a procedure observes random variables Z1, . . . , Zn, Fano’s inequality ensures
that for any estimate v̂ of V—that is, any measurable function v̂ of Z1, . . . , Zn—the test error
probability satisfies the lower bound
P(v̂(Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= V ) ≥ 1− I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) + log 2
log |V| . (24)
By contrast, Le Cam’s method provides lower bounds on the probability of error in binary hy-
pothesis testing problems. In this setting, assume that V = {−1, 1} has two elements, and let
V ∈ V be chosen uniformly at random from V. If a procedure observes random variables Z1, . . . , Zn
distributed according to Qn1 if V = 1 and Q
n
−1 if V = −1, then any estimate v̂ of V satisfies the
lower bound
P (v̂(Z1, . . . , Zn) 6= V ) ≥ 1
2
− 1
2
∥∥Qn1 −Qn−1∥∥TV . (25)
See, for example, Le Cam [33, Section 2] or Yu [50, Lemma 1].
Using the lower bound provided by Lemma 1 and Fano’s inequality (24) or Le Cam’s inequal-
ity (25), the structure of our remaining proofs becomes more apparent. Each lower bound argument
proceeds in three steps:
(1) We construct a collection of loss functions satisfying Definition 3, computing the minimal
separation (23) so that we may apply Lemma 1.
(2) The second step is to provide an upper bound on the appropriate information theoretic quan-
tity in order to apply Fano’s inequality (24), in which case we bound I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ), or Le
Cam’s inequality (25), where we bound
∥∥Qn1 −Qn−1∥∥TV. This step requires the most work and
constitutes the major arguments in this section. We provide these bounds using one of two
techniques:
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(a) In the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3, we use a distribution Q that satisfies Definition 1 of
optimal local privacy (Theorems 1 and 2) or Definition 2 of optimal local differential privacy
(Theorem 3). We can then explicitly upper bound the mutual information I(Z1:n;V ) using
the definition ofQ and the losses ℓ from step 1. (See Lemmas 4, 5, 7, and 8 in the subsequent
sections.)
(b) In the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5, we use a bound on mutual information in non-interactive
locally differentially private schemes, which we recently presented [12]. This requires a
careful packing construction in conjunction with the loss choice from step 1.
(3) The final step is to use the results of Steps 1 and 2 in the application of Lemma 1 and Fano’s
inequality (24) (when the dimension d is low, we use Le Cam’s inequality (25)). This then
yields the theorems.
We now turn to the proofs of the theorems. We provide each proof in turn, following the steps in
the preceding outline.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We provide the most detail in the proof of this theorem, as it closely exhibits the blueprint by
which we prove the other results.
5.2.1 Constructing well-separated losses
The first step in proving our minimax lower bounds is to construct a family of well-separated risks.
For Theorem 1, we use one of two families of loss functions: linear losses and median-based losses.
Each of these gives a well-separated family with subgradients bounded in ℓ∞-norm.
Linear losses Our first collection of risk functionals is relatively simple, based on families of
linear loss functions; we describe the sampling scheme for X to generate them. Let V = {±ei}di=1,
where the vectors ei are the standard basis vectors in R
d, whence |V| = 2d. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1], which
we specify later. We choose the distribution P on X to be nearly uniform on X ∈ {−1, 1}d.
Conditional on the parameter v ∈ V, we use the following sampling distribution for X:
Choose X ∈ {−1, 1}d with independent coordinates, where Xj =
{
1 w.p.
1+δvj
2
−1 w.p. 1−δvj2 .
(26)
Now for L ∈ R+ we may define the linear loss functions
ℓ(X, θ) := L 〈X, θ〉 = L
d∑
j=1
Xjθj. (27)
By inspection, the final risk is Rv(θ) = EP [〈θ,X〉] = Lδ 〈v, θ〉. We obtain the following result on
the separation of the risks.
Lemma 2. Given the sampling scheme (26),
(a) The loss (27) is L-Lipschitz with respect to the ℓ1-norm.
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(b) For the optimization domain Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ r}, the ρ-separation of the set V = {±ei}di=1
is ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ.
Proof The first statement of the lemma is immediate, since ∇ℓ(X, θ) = LX and ‖X‖∞ ≤ 1
(cf. [26]). For the second, we verify that infθ∈Θ[Rv(θ) + Rw(θ)] − Rv(θ∗v) − Rw(θ∗w) ≥ Lrδ. To do
so, we compute the minimizers of Rv: since ℓ1 and ℓ∞ are dual norms, we see that for v ∈ V,
inf
‖θ‖1≤r
Rv(θ) = inf
‖θ‖1≤r
Lδ 〈v, θ〉 = −Lδr ‖v‖∞ = −Lδr,
and the minimizer is uniquely attained at θ∗v = −rv. Then we have for any w 6= v that
inf
‖θ‖
1
≤1
[〈v +w, θ〉] + ‖v‖∞ + ‖w‖∞ = −‖v +w‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖w‖∞ ≥ −1 + 1 + 1 = 1,
since any non-zero coefficients of v and w have differing signs. Multiplying the result by Lrδ com-
pletes the proof.
Median-type losses We now describe a class of median-type losses, one with more general appli-
cability than the linear losses of Section 5.2.1. Let V ⊂ {−1, 1}d be a subset of the binary hypercube
such that for all distinct pairs v 6= v′, we have ‖v − v′‖1 ≥ d/2, or equivalently ‖v − v′‖0 ≥ d/4.
From the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [50, Lemma 4] there are sets of this form with cardinality at
least card(V) ≥ exp(d/8). We define the distribution on X, conditional on v ∈ V, as
Choose X ∈ {−1, 1}d with independent coordinates, where Xj =
{
1 w.p.
1+δvj
2
−1 w.p. 1−δvj2 .
(28)
For L > 0, we then define the median-type loss function
ℓ(X, θ) = L ‖rX − θ‖1 , (29)
which under the sampling scheme (28) gives rise to the risk functional
Rv(θ) = L
d∑
j=1
1 + δvj
2
|θj − r|+ 1− δvj
2
|θj + r| = L
(
1 + δ
2
‖θ − rv‖1 +
1− δ
2
‖θ + rv‖1
)
.
By construction, whenever Θ contains the ℓ∞ ball of radius r, this risk function has the unique
minimizer
θ∗v := argmin
θ∈Θ
Rv(θ) = rv ∈ r{−1, 1}d ⊂ Θ.
The following lemma, due to Agarwal et al. [1], captures the separation properties of the collection
{Rv}v∈V of risk functionals:
Lemma 3. Assume that Θ contains [−r, r]d and let Rv be defined as in the preceding paragraph.
If v,w ∈ V with v 6= w, the discrepancy ρ(Rv, Rw) ≥ rLdδ/2.
As a final remark, for random variables X ∈ Rd, the loss function (29) is Lipschitz continuous
(for appropriate choice of L) for any distribution P on X. Specifically, defining the sign(·) function
coordinate-wise, we have the subgradient equality ∂ℓ(x, θ) = L sign(θ−rx). Thus, for any p ∈ [1,∞]
and Lp ≥ 0, setting L = Lpd−1/p yields a member of the collection of (Lp, p)-loss functions.
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5.2.2 Bounding the mutual information
As outlined in Section 5.1, the second step in our lower bound proofs is to bound the mutual
information I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ), where Zi are the private views available to the learning method.
Here we provide mutual information bounds for the family of linear losses (Lemma 4) and median-
based losses (Lemma 5). Each of these mutual information bounds—and our subsequent bounds
on mutual information—proceed by using independence to reduce the problem to estimating the
mutual information I(Z;V | θ) for a single randomized gradient sample Z. Then, careful calculation
of the distribution of Z | V yields the final inequalities. As the proofs are somewhat long and
technical, we defer them to Appendix B.
Lemma 4. Let V be drawn uniformly at random from V = {±ei}di=1. Let X have the distri-
bution (26) conditional on V = v and assume ℓ(X, θ) = L 〈X, θ〉. Let Z be constructed accord-
ing to the conditional distribution specified by Proposition 1 given a subgradient ∂ℓ(Xi; θ) with
Z ∈ [−M∞,M∞]d, where M∞ ≥ L. Then
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ nδ
2L2
M2∞
.
See Appendix B.1 for a proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Let V be drawn uniformly at random from a set V ⊂ {−1, 1}d. Let X have the
distribution (28) conditional on V = v and assume ℓ(X, θ) = L ‖rX − θ‖1, where r > 0 is a
constant. Let Z be constructed according to the distribution specified by Proposition 1 conditional
on a subgradient ∂ℓ(Xi; θ), where Z ∈ [−M∞,M∞]d and M∞ ≥ L. Then
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ nδ
2L2d
M2∞
.
See Appendix B.2 for a proof of Lemma 5.
5.2.3 Applying testing inequalities
Having established the two families of loss functions we consider and the resultant mutual infor-
mation bounds, it remains to apply Lemma 1 and a testing inequality. We begin by proving part
(a) of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1(a) We divide the proof of part (a) of the theorem into two parts: one
assuming the dimension d ≥ 9 and the other assuming d < 9. For the first, we use Fano’s inequal-
ity (24), while for the second, an application of Le Cam’s method (25) completes the result. For
both results, we use the median-type loss ℓ(X, θ) = L ‖rX − θ‖1. We first recall the beginning of
the previous section, stating the following application of Lemma 1 and Fano’s inequality (24):
2
ρ⋆(V)EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ PP,Q (v̂(M) 6= V ) ≥ 1−
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) + log 2
log |V| . (30)
Now we give the proof of the first statement of the theorem in the case that d ≥ 9. Applying
Lemmas 3 and 5, we immediately have the following specialization of the inequality (30):
4
rLdδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1− log 2
log |V| − n
δ2L2d
M2∞ log |V|
.
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Taking the set V ⊂ {−1, 1}d to be a d/4 packing of the hypercube {−1, 1}d satisfying |V| ≥ exp(d/8),
as in our construction of median-type losses in Section 5.2.1, we see that
4
rLdδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1− 8 log 2
d
− n8δ
2L2
M2∞
.
The numerical inequality 8 log 2 < 6 coupled with the preceding bound implies
4
rdLδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] > 1− 6
d
− 8nδ
2L2
M2∞
.
By our assumption that d ≥ 9, if we choose δ = min{M∞/8L
√
n, 1}, we are guaranteed the lower
bound 4rdLδEP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] > 15 , or equivalently
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] > rdLδ
20
=
1
20
·min
{
rdL,
M∞rd
8
√
n
}
.
When d < 9, we may reduce to the case that d = 1, since a lower bound in this setting extends
to higher dimensions (though we may lose dimension dependence). For this case, we use the packing
set V = {−1, 1} with the linear loss function from Lemma 2, which has ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ. In this case,
the marginal distribution Q(· | V ) is given by
Q(Z = z | V = 1) = 1
2
+
{
δL
2M if z =M
− δL2M otherwise, i.e. if z = −M.
Now, let Qn(· | V ) denote the distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn conditional on V . Then applying Lemma 1
and Le Cam’s lower bound (25), we obtain the inequality
2
rLδ
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ PP,Q (v̂(M) 6= V ) ≥ 1
2
− 1
2
‖Qn(· | V = 1)−Qn(· | V = −1)‖TV .
A standard result on the total variation distance of Bernoulli distributions (see Lemma 13 in
Appendix B.5) implies that
‖Qn(· | V = 1)−Qn(· | V = −1)‖TV ≤
δL
M
√
(3/2)n
if δ ≤M/(3L). Thus we have the bound
2
rLδ
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1
2
−
√
3n
2
√
2
· δL
M
. (31)
Multiplying both sides by rLδ, then setting δ = min{M/(3L√n), 1} ≤M/(3L), we have
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
6
)
rLδ
2
≥
√
6− 1
4
√
6
rLmin
{
M
3L
√
n
, 1
}
.
In turn, for any d ≤ 8, we immediately find that (√6 − 1)/4√6 ≥ d/(9 · 20), which completes the
proof of Theorem 1(a).
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Proof of Theorem 1(b) For the second statement of the theorem, we use the linear losses of
Section 5.2.1 and apply Lemmas 2 and 4 with the choice V = {±ei}di=1. In this case, the lower
bound (30) and Lemma 2’s separation guarantee imply that
2
Lrδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1− log 2
log(2d)
− I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V )
log(2d)
.
We may assume that d ≥ 2 (using the result of part (a) for d = 1), and we have log 2/ log(2d) ≤ 1/2,
which, after an application of Lemma 4, yields
2
Lrδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1
2
− n δ
2L2
M2∞ log(2d)
.
If we choose δ = min{M∞
√
log(2d)/2L
√
n, 1}, we see that we have
2
Lrδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1
4
,
which is equivalent in this case to
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ rLδ
8
=
1
8
min
{
Lr,
M∞r
√
log(2d)
2
√
n
}
.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is quite similar to that of Theorem 1, again following our outline from
Section 5.1. In this section, however, we construct a different family of loss functions, necessitating
a new mutual information bound.
5.3.1 Constructing well-separated losses
We construct families of losses that are useful for analyzing the case of stochastic subgradients
bounded in ℓ1-norm. As was the case with median losses (recall Section 5.2.1), let V ⊂ {−1, 1}d
be a d/4-packing of the hypercube in ℓ0-norm; we know there is such a set with cardinality |V| ≥
exp(d/8). As our sampling process for the data, we choose X from among the 2d positive and
negative standard basis vectors ±ej , namely
Choose index j ∈ {1, . . . , d} uniformly at random, and set X =
{
ej w.p.
1+δvj
2
−ej w.p. 1−δvj2 ,
(32)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is fixed. For a fixed L > 0, we define the hinge loss, common in classification
problems,
ℓ(x, θ) = L [r − 〈x, θ〉]+ . (33)
The combination of hinge loss (33) and sampling strategy (32) yields the risk functional
Rv(θ) =
L
d
d∑
j=1
1 + δvj
2
[r − 〈ej , θ〉]+ +
L
d
d∑
j=1
1− δvj
2
[r + 〈ej, θ〉]+ .
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Assuming that Θ contains the ℓ∞ ball of radius r, the (unique) minimizer of the risk over Θ is
θ∗v := argmin
θ∈Θ
Rv(θ) = rv ∈ r{−1, 1}d ⊂ Θ.
Moreover, this risk has the following properties:
Lemma 6. For any set Θ ⊇ [−r, r]d, we have:
(a) For P with support suppP ⊆ {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1}, the loss function (33) is L-Lipschitz with
respect to the ℓ∞-norm.
(b) If v,w ∈ V with v 6= w, the discrepancy ρ(Rv, Rw) ≥ rLδ/2.
Proof The first claim is immediate (cf. [26]), since ‖∂ℓ(x, θ)‖1 ≤ L ‖x‖1 ≤ L. For the second
statement of the lemma, as in the proof of Lemma 2 we verify the separation condition directly by
computing the minimizers of Rv. The minimum of
Rv(θ)+Rw(θ) =
L
d
d∑
j=1
(
[r − 〈ej, θ〉]+ + [r + 〈ej , θ〉]+
)
+
Lδ
d
∑
j:vj=wj
vj
(
[r − 〈ej , θ〉]+ − [r + 〈ej , θ〉]+
)
is attained by any θ ∈ Rd with θj ∈ [−r, r] for j such that vj 6= wj and θj = rvj for j such that
vj = wj; a minimizer of Rv is θ
∗
v = rv. Thus we have
inf
θ∈Θ
{Rv(θ) +Rw(θ)} −Rv(θ∗v)−Rw(θ∗w) =
L
d
d∑
j=1
2r − 2L
d
∑
j:vj=wj
rδ − Lr(1− δ)− Lr(1− δ)
= 2Lr − 2Lr + 2Lrδ − 2Lrδ
d
(d− ‖v − w‖0) =
2Lrδ
d
‖v − w‖0 .
Since ‖v − w‖0 ≥ d/4 by construction, we have ρ(Rv , Rw) ≥ rLδ/2, as desired.
5.3.2 Bounding the mutual information
For Theorem 2, we require a somewhat careful bound on the mutual information between the
subgradients and the unknown index. We have the following lemma, whose proof we provide in
Appendix B.3.
Lemma 7. Let V be drawn uniformly at random from a set V ⊂ {−1, 1}d. Define the distribution
P (· | A) on X as in the random sampling scheme (32) and use the loss (33). Let Z be constructed
according to the conditional distribution specified by Proposition 2, where Z ∈ {z ∈ Rd : ‖z‖1 ≤
M1}, and define M =M1/L. Then
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ nδ2∆(γ)2,
where
γ := log
(
2d− 2 +
√
(2d − 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1)
)
and ∆(γ) :=
eγ − e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2(d− 1) .
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5.3.3 Applying testing inequalities
The remainder of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, except that we apply Lemma 7 in place
of Lemmas 4 or 5. Indeed, following identical steps to those in the proof of Theorem 1, we see that
with the specified packing V ⊂ {−1, 1}d of size |V| ≥ exp(d/8), we have (recall Eq. (30))
4
rLδ
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1− log 2
log |V| − n
δ2∆(γ)2
log |V| ≥ 1−
6
d
− 8nδ
2∆(γ)2
d
.
Consequently, if we choose δ = min{√d/(8∆(γ)√n), 1}, then for all d ≥ 9, we have the lower bound
4
rLδEP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 15 , or equivalently
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ rLδ
20
=
1
20
min
{
rL,
rL
√
d
8
√
n∆(γ)
}
,
which completes the proof (the case d ≤ 8 is identical to that in Theorem 1).
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We are somewhat more terse in our proof of Theorem 3 than the previous two, though we repeat
the same steps to emphasize our technique.
5.4.1 Constructing well-separated losses
We begin by choosing the family of loss functions we require: since our optimization domain
Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ r}, we use the linear losses of Section 5.2.1 with the sampling scheme (26)
as in Theorem 1. Thus, using the packing set V = {±ei}di=1, we find that ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ, and
consequently
2
Lrδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1− log 2
log(2d)
− I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V )
log(2d)
as earlier.
5.4.2 Bounding the mutual information
The mutual information bound in this theorem is somewhat more complicated than the previous
bounds, as the optimal privacy-preserving distribution (recall Proposition 3) is more complex. We
begin by stating a lemma.
Lemma 8. Let V be drawn uniformly at random from V = {±ei}di=1. Let X | V be sampled
according to the distribution (26), and let Z | X = x have support on {−1, 1}d and have p.m.f.
q(z | x) ∝
{
exp(α) if z⊤x > k
1 if z⊤x ≤ k
for some k ≥ 0. Define the constants Cd(k) and ∆(δ, α, d, k) by
Cd(k) := card
{
z ∈ {−1, 1}d : 〈z, x〉 > k
}
=
⌈(d−k)/2⌉−1∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
.
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and
∆(δ, α, d, k) := δ · e
α − 1
(eα + 1)Cd(k) + 2d
(
d− 1
⌈(d− k)/2⌉ − 1
)
.
Then
I(Z;V ) ≤ ∆(δ, α, d, k)2 .
We provide the proof of the lemma in Appendix B.4.
For any α ≤ 5/4, we have eα − 1 ≤ 2α, and by properties of binomial coefficients and Stirling’s
approximation we have
1
2d
(
d− 1
⌈(d− k)/2⌉ − 1
)
≤ 1
2d
(
d− 1
⌈d/2⌉ − 1
)
≤ 1√
d
for any k. For any distributionQ satisfying optimal local differential privacy at a differential privacy
level α, Proposition 3 implies Q is a convex combination of distributions with p.m.f.s of the form
in Lemma 8. That is, we sample with a channel Q whose p.m.f. is a convex combination of p.m.f.s
of the form
qk(z | x) = 1
eαCd(k) + (2d − Cd(k))
·
{
exp(α) if z⊤x/M > k
1 if z⊤x/M ≤ k for z ∈ {−M,M}
d,
so Q(Z = z | x) = ∑k βkqk(z | x) for some βk ≥ 0 with ∑k βk = 1. Applying the convexity
of mutual information—taking a convex combination of channel distributions Q can only reduce
mutual information—and Lemma 8, we thus obtain
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ nmax
k≥0
∆(δ, α, d, k)2 (34)
≤ nδ2(eα − 1)2max
k
(
1
(eα + 1)Cd(k) + 2d
(
d− 1
⌈(d− k)/2⌉ − 1
))2
≤ 4nδ2α2 · 1
d
.
5.4.3 Applying testing inequalities
As a consequence of the display (34), we have the lower bound
2
Lrδ
EP,Q [ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1
2
−max
k
n∆(δ, α, d, k)2
log(2d)
≥ 1
2
− 4nδ
2α2
d log(2d)
.
By choosing δ = min{
√
d log(2d)/4α
√
n, 1}, we find that
2
Lrδ
EP,Q[ǫn(M, ℓ,Θ, P )] ≥ 1
4
,
which is equivalent to the bound given in the theorem.
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5.5 Proof of Theorem 4
In our proofs of Theorems 4 and 5, we exploit some of our own recent results [12] on the contractive
properties of mutual information and KL-divergence under local differential privacy. A few defini-
tions are required in order to state these results. As usual, we have an indexed set of probability
measures {Pv}v∈V , and we let Qn(· | x1, . . . , xn) denote the joint probability of the n released
private random variables Z1, . . . , Zn. For each v ∈ V, we then define the marginal distribution
Mnv (A) :=
∫
Qn(A | x1, . . . , xn)dPnv (x1, . . . , xn) for A ∈ σ(Zn). (35)
Duchi et al. [12] establish two results that provide bounds on ‖Mnv −Mnw‖TV and I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) as
a function of the amount of privacy provided and the distances between the underlying distributions
Pv.
The bounds apply to any channel distribution Q that is α-locally differentially private (for
the first result) and to any non-interactive α-locally differentially private channel (for the second
result; recall the definition (3)). Let Pv be the distribution of X conditional on the random packing
element V = v, and let Mnv be the marginal distribution (35) induced by passing Xi through Q.
Define the mixture distribution P = 1|V|
∑
v∈V Pv, and let σ(X ) denote the σ-field on X over which
Pv are defined. With this notation we can state the following proposition, which summarizes the
results we need from Duchi et al. [12, Theorems 1–2, Corollaries 1–2]:
Proposition 4 (Information bounds). Let the conditions of the previous paragraph hold and assume
that Q is α-locally differentially private.
(a) For all α ≥ 0,
Dkl (M
n
v ‖Mnw) ≤ 4n(eα − 1)2 ‖Pv − Pw‖2TV . (36)
(b) If Q is non-interactive, then for all α ≥ 0,
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ eαn
(
eα − e−α)2 sup
S∈σ(X )
1
|V|
∑
v∈V
(
Pv(S)− P (S)
)2
. (37)
With Proposition 4 in place, we proceed with the proof of Theorem 4. To establish the lower bound,
we follow the outline of Section 5.1. Establishing the upper bound requires a few additional steps.
We defer the formal proofs of achievability to Appendix C (see C.1), as the proofs are similar to
Corollaries 1–3.
5.5.1 Constructing well-separated losses
Our lower bound uses an identical construction to that in Section 5.2.1. We let the loss function
ℓ(x, θ) = L 〈x, θ〉, and we use the distribution (26) on x; that is, we have V = {±ej}dj=1 and for
δ ∈ [0, 1/2], we sample vectors from X = {−1, 1}d with probability Pv(X = x) = (1 + δv⊤x)/2d.
We then have ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ and |V| = 2d (recall Lemma 2).
5.5.2 Bounding the mutual information
With the construction of the (nearly) uniform sampling scheme, we have the following lemma [12,
Lemma 7].
Lemma 9. Under the conditions of the previous paragraph, let δ ≤ 1 and V be sampled uniformly
from {±ej}dj=1. For any non-interactive α-differentially private channel Q,
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ ne
α
4d
(
eα − e−α)2 δ2.
5.5.3 Applying testing inequalities
Using Lemma 9, we can give an almost immediate proof of the lower bound in Theorem 4. Indeed,
using Fano’s inequality (24), Lemmas 1 and 9, and the separation ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ from Lemma 2(b),
we obtain
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) ≥
Lrδ
2
(
1− ne
α(eα − e−α)2δ2/4d + log 2
log(2d)
)
.
So long as d ≥ 2, setting
δ = min
{ √
d log(2d)√
eαn(eα − e−α) , 1
}
and noting that eα = O(1) and eα− e−α ≤ cα for a universal constant c if α = O(1) completes the
proof.
When d = 1, an argument via Le Cam’s method (25) yields an identical result. Given Proposi-
tion 4, the argument is quite similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 1. We use the packing
set V = {±1} and conditional on V = v, set X = 1 with probability (1 + vδ)/2 and X = −1
with probability (1 − vδ)/2, which yields separation ρ⋆(V) = Lrδ by Lemma 2. We also have the
marginal contraction∥∥Mn1 −Mn−1∥∥2TV ≤ 12Dkl (Mn1 ‖Mn−1) ≤ 2(eα − 1)2n ‖P1 − P−1‖2TV
by Pinsker’s inequality and Proposition 4. By construction, the total variation ‖P1 − P−1‖TV = δ,
whence we find that
∥∥Mn1 −Mn−1∥∥2TV ≤ 2(eα − 1)2nδ2. Applying Le Cam’s method (25) and
Lemma 1, we obtain
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) ≥
Lrδ
2
(
1
2
−
√
n(eα − 1)δ√
2
)
.
Take δ = min{(2√2√n(eα − 1))−1 , 1} to complete the proof in this case.
5.6 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of this theorem follows the outline established in Section 5.1, as did the previous results.
We defer the attainability results to Appendix C.2.
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5.6.1 Constructing well-separated losses
Before constructing the well-separated loss functions, we exhibit the set V that underlies our sam-
pling distributions. The following lemma exhibits the existence of a special packing of the Boolean
hypercube [12, Lemma 5]:
Lemma 10. There exists a packing V of the d-dimensional hypercube {−1, 1}d with ‖v − w‖1 ≥ d/2
for each v,w ∈ V with v 6= w such that the cardinality of V is at least ⌈exp(d/16)⌉ and
1
|V|
∑
v∈V
vv⊤  25Id×d.
With this packing V, we as usual let V ∈ V, and conditional on V = v, we sample X ∈ {±ej}dj=1
according the sampling scheme (32).
Linear losses (for the bound (18)) We first consider the case that the loss functions are linear
functionals that are L-Lipschitz with respect to the ℓp′-norm for some p
′ ≥ 2, and we optimize over
ℓq balls Bq(rq). In this case, we define the loss ℓ(x, θ) = L 〈x, θ〉, and we note that since ‖x‖1 ≤ 1
for x ∈ X , the function ℓ(x, ·) is L-Lipschitz with respect to the ℓ∞-norm. With the sampling
scheme (32), Rv(θ) = Lδ 〈v, θ〉 /d. Since infθ∈Bq(rq) 〈v, θ〉 = −‖v‖p when p = (1 − 1/q)−1 is the
conjugate of q, we have the pairwise separation
ρ(Rv , Rw) = −rqLδ
d
(
‖v + w‖p − ‖v‖p − ‖w‖p
)
.
With the packing set V exhibited by Lemma 10, we have
‖v + w‖pp =
d∑
j=1
(vj + wj)
p =
∑
j:vj=wj
2p ≤ 3d
4
2p,
and ‖v‖p = d1/p for each v ∈ V. This implies the following lower bound on the discrepancy:
ρ⋆(V) ≥ max
v 6=w
ρ(Rv, Rw) ≥ rLδ
d
(
2d1/p(1− (3/4)1/p)
)
≥ 3
5
rLδd
1
p
−1
. (38)
General loss functions (for the bound (19)) For the general lower bound of the theorem, we
use the hinge loss ℓ(x, θ) = L [r − 〈x, θ〉]+ as our loss function. In this case, as in Theorem 2 (recall
Lemma 6), our sampling strategy yields that the loss ℓ(x, θ) is an (L, 1) loss, since ‖x‖1 ≤ 1, and
we have the discrepancy bound ρ⋆(V) ≥ rLδ2 , since the separation depends only on the distance
‖v − w‖1, which Lemma 10 lower bounds.
5.6.2 Bounding the mutual information
Using Lemma 10, we may bound the mutual information between samples Z from a particular
distribution and a random sample V from a set V of the form in the lemma. Indeed, let V be a
packing of the d-dimensional hypercube specified in Lemma 10. Conditional on V = v ∈ {−1, 1}d,
we sample the random vector X ∈ {±ej}dj=1 according to the sampling scheme (32). Then we have
the following lemma [12, Lemma 6], which applies as long as the channel Q is non-interactive and
α-locally differentially private.
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Lemma 11. Let Zi be α-locally differentially private for Xi and the conditions of the previous
paragraph hold. Then
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤ n25e
α
16
δ2
d
(eα − e−α)2.
5.6.3 Applying testing inequalities
Our last step is to apply the usual testing inequalities. We first prove the lower bound in inequal-
ity (18). Let Llin = Llin(Bq(rq);L, p). Then by applying Lemma 11 and Fano’s inequality (24) to
Lemma 1—using the separation (38)—we obtain
ǫ∗n(Llin,Θ, α) ≥
3rqLδd
1
p
−1
10
(
1− 25ne
αδ2(eα − e−α)2/16d + log 2
d/16
)
.
So long as d ≥ 16, we have 16 log 2/d ≤ log 2 < 7/10. Thus choosing
δ = min
{
d
10
√
nCα(eα − e−α)
, 1
}
and noting that eα − e−α = O(α) and eα = O(1) for α = O(1) we obtain
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) ≥
3rqLδd
1
p
−1
10
· 1
20
≥ cmin
{
rqLd
1
p
√
nα2
, rqLd
1
p
−1
}
= crqLmin
{
d
1− 1
q
√
nα2
, d
1
p
−1
}
.
for a universal constant c. As in the proof of Theorem 4, when d < 16, we apply an essentially
similar argument but with Le Cam’s method (25), which gives the desired result. (The proof of
the case d = 1 from Theorem 4 applies here as well.) Finally, we remark that we may repeat
a completely identical proof as that above replacing d with any k ≤ d, which mutatis mutandis
implies the lower bound
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) ≥ cLrq max
k∈[d]
min
{
k
1− 1
q
√
nα2
, k
1
p
−1
}
≥ cLrqmin
{
d
1− 1
q
√
nα2
,
(nα2)
1
2p
√
nα2
, 1
}
,
where for the rightmost bound we have taken k = max{1,min{
√
nα2, d}}. Noting that 1/p = 1−1/q
completes the proof of the lower bound (18).
To prove inequality (19), we apply the same reasoning as in the proof of the inequality (18).
Use Lemma 11 and Fano’s inequality (24) (via Lemma 1 and the separation from Lemma 6) to
obtain
ǫ∗n(L,Θ, α) ≥
rLδ
4
(
1− 25ne
α(eα − e−α)2δ2/16d + log 2
d/16
)
.
Then choosing δ ≍ d/(√n(eα − e−α)) as in the proof of inequality (18) gives the desired result.
5.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Since Θ ⊆ {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ r}, the bound (14a) guarantees that mirror descent obtains convergence
rate O(M∞r
√
log(2d)/
√
n). This matches the second statement of Theorem 1. Now fix our desired
amount of mutual information I∗. From the remarks following Proposition 1, if we must guarantee
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that I∗ ≥ supP I(P,Q) for any distribution P and loss function ℓ whose gradients are bounded in
ℓ∞-norm by L, we must (because of the uniqueness of the optimal privacy distribution Q) have
I∗ ≍ dL
2
M2∞
. (39)
Up to higher order terms, to guarantee a level of privacy with mutual information I∗, we must
allow gradient noise up to a level M∞ = L
√
d/I∗. The equality (39) establishes that for a given
level of allowed mutual information I∗, if optimal local privacy holds, then we must have M∞ ≍
L
√
d/
√
I∗. That is, we have a bijection between I∗ and M∞ whenever optimal local privacy holds,
so substituting M∞ = L
√
d/
√
I∗ into our upper and lower bounds yields the claim.
5.8 Proof of Corollary 2
According to the conditions of optimal local privacy, if we must guarantee that I∗ ≥ supP I(P,Q)
for any loss function ℓ whose gradients are bounded in ℓ1-norm by L, we must have
I∗ ≍ dL
2
2M21
,
using Corollary 4 after the statement of Proposition 2. Rewriting this, we see that we must have
M1 = L
√
d/2I∗ (to higher order terms) to be able to guarantee an amount of privacy I∗. As in
the ℓ∞ case, we have a bijection between the multiplier M1 and the amount of information I
∗ and
can apply similar techniques. Now recall the convergence guarantee (14b) provided by stochastic
gradient descent. Since the ℓ∞-ball of radius r is contained in the ℓ2-ball of radius r2 = r
√
d, and
‖g‖1 ≤ ‖g‖2 for all g ∈ Rd, stochastic gradient descent guarantees that ǫ∗n(L,Θ) ≤ CM1r
√
d/
√
n.
Applying the lower bound provided by Theorem 2 and substituting for M1 completes the proof.
5.9 Proof of Corollary 3
Without loss of generality (by scaling), we assume that L = 1. Now we consider Proposition 3, which
characterizes the distributions satisfying optimal local differential privacy. We use the proposition
to find an upper bound on M∞ in terms of the differential privacy level α, which in turn allows us
to apply the bound from mirror descent (14a). Instead of directly using Proposition 3, it is simpler
to use the linear program (61) in its proof, and note that finding a lower bound on t (in the LP) as
a function of α provides an upper bound on M∞ sinceM∞ = 1/t. Now, in the linear program (61),
we choose the values for q(z) specified by Lemma 19. Let q+ and q− denote the larger and smaller
probabilities, respectively. Fix an x ∈ {−1, 1}d, and let z range over {−1, 1}d. With those choices,
we note that for d odd,∑
z:〈z,x〉>0
z =
∑
z:〈z,x〉=1
z +
∑
z:〈z,x〉=3
z + . . .+
∑
z:〈z,x〉=d
z
=
[(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
−
(
d− 1
d+1
2
)]
x+
[(
d− 1
d+1
2
)
−
(
d− 1
d+3
2
)]
x+ . . . =
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
x.
For d even, a similar calculation yields
∑
z:〈z,x〉>0 z =
(
d−1
d/2
)
x. As a consequence, we find that
∑
z
zq(z | x) = q+
∑
z:〈z,x〉>0
z + q−
∑
z:〈z,x〉≤0
z = x(q+ − q−) ·
{(d−1
d−1
2
)
d odd(
d−1
d/2
)
d even.
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Focusing on the odd case for simplicity—identical bounds hold in the even case—we have for a
universal constant c > 0 that
(q+ − q−)
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
=
eα − 1
2d−1(eα + 1)
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
≥ ce
α − 1
eα + 1
1√
d
≥ c α√
d
,
the first inequality following from Stirling’s approximation and the second from convexity of the
function α 7→ eα. In particular, we see that the minimizing value t in the linear program (61) will
satisfy t ≥ cα/√d, which in turn yields M∞ = 1/t ≤
√
d/(cα). Noting that the lower bound in the
corollary is given by Theorem 3, applying the convergence guarantee (14a) of mirror descent based
on M∞ completes the proof.
6 Discussion
We have studied methods for protecting privacy in general statistical risk minimization problems,
and have described general techniques for obtaining sharp tradeoffs between privacy protection and
estimation rates. The latter are a natural measure of utility for statistical problems.
We believe that there are a number of interesting open issues and areas for future work. First,
we studied procedures that access each datum only once, and through a perturbed view Zi of
the subgradient ∂ℓ(Xi, θ), which is natural in the context of convex risk minimization. A natural
question is whether there are restrictions of the class of loss functions so that a transformed version
(Z1, . . . , Zn) of the data are sufficient for inference. For instance, other researchers [51, 52] have
studied applications in which a data matrix X = [X1 · · · Xn]⊤ ∈ Rn×d is pre-multiplied by
a normal matrix Φ ∈ Rm×n, where m ≪ n, and statistical inference is performed using ΦX.
For problems such as linear regression and PCA, the resulting estimators enjoy good statistical
properties. This transformation, however, cannot be computed without the entire dataset at one’s
disposal. Nonparametric data releases, such as those studied by Hall et al. [24], could provide
insights here, though again, current approaches require the data to be aggregated by a trusted
curator before release.
Our constraints on the privacy-inducing channel distribution Q require that its support lie
in some compact set. We find this restriction useful, but perhaps it possible to achieve faster
estimation rates if all we require are moment conditions, for example, EQ[‖Z −X‖2p | X] ≤M2. A
better understanding of general privacy-preserving channels Q for alternative constraints to those
we have proposed is also desirable. Moreover, one might consider attempting only to guarantee
that φ(X) is private, where φ is some (known) function. For example, members of a dataset may
not care if their genders are known, but more personal features of X may be more sensitive.
These questions do not appear to have easy answers, especially when we wish to allow each
provider of a single datum to be able to guarantee his or her own privacy. Nevertheless, we hope
that our view of privacy and the techniques we have developed herein prove fruitful, and we hope
to investigate some of the above issues in future work.
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A Unbiasedness
In this appendix, we show that if an optimization procedure receives biased subgradients it is
possible to be arbitrarily wrong. We do so by constructing a simple problem instance. Fix a bias
b > 0 and consider the following one-dimensional problem:
minimize f(θ) :=
bθ
2
subject to θ ∈ [−c, c].
If a gradient oracle returns biased gradients of the form −b/2 at each point θ ∈ [−c, c], it is impos-
sible to distinguish the objective from −bθ/2. The minimizer of this objective is θbias = sign(b)c.
The true optimal point is θ∗ = − sign(b)c, yielding the worst possible error
f(θbias)− f(θ∗) = sup
θ∈[−c,c]
f(θ)− inf
θ∈[−c,c]
f(θ).
We can show this more formally using an information theoretic derivation similar to that in Sec-
tion 5. Omitting details, the argument is as follows. In the notation of Section 5, if a bias is
chosen independently of the parameters v ∈ V of the risk Rv, then there is a bounded amount
of mutual information that can be communicated to any optimization procedure. Consequently,
Fano’s inequality (24) guarantees that the estimation accuracy of any procedure must be bounded
away from zero.
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B Calculation of the Mutual Information for Sampling Strategies
This appendix is devoted to the proofs of our bounds on mutual information: Lemma 4, Lemma 5,
Lemma 7, and Lemma 8. Before proving the lemmas, we make an observation that allows us to
tensorize the mutual information, making our arguments simpler (we need only compute the single
observation information I(Z1;V )). For each of Lemmas 4, 5, 7, and 8, recall that Z1, . . . , Zn are
constructed based on an evaluation of the subgradient set ∂θℓ(Xi, θ), where Xi are independent
samples according to a distribution P (· | V ). Then the samples Zi are conditionally independent of
V given Xi and the parameters θ, since Z is a random function of ∂ℓ(Xi, θ). Our goal is to upper
bound the mutual information between the sequence Z1, . . . , Zn of observed (stochastic) gradients
and the random element V ∈ V.
By the general definition of mutual information [23, Chapter 5], it is no loss of generality to
assume (temporarily) that the random variable Zi are supported on finite sets. Thus (using the
chain rule for mutual information [8, 23, Chapter 5]) we have the decomposition
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) =
n∑
i=1
[H(Zi | Z1, . . . , Zi−1)−H(Zi | V,Z1, . . . , Zi−1)] .
Let θi denote the point at which the ith gradient is computed. Then by inspection, we must have
θi ∈ σ(Z1, . . . , Zi−1). Since Zi is conditionally independent of Z1, . . . , Zi−1 given V and θi and
conditioning decreases entropy, we have
H(Zi | Z1, . . . , Zi−1)−H(Zi | V,Z1, . . . , Zi−1) = H(Zi | Z1, . . . , Zi−1)−H(Zi | V, θi)
≤ H(Zi | θi)−H(Zi | V, θi)
= I(Zi;V | θi).
In particular, letting Fi denote the distribution of θi, we have
I(Z1, . . . , Zn;V ) ≤
n∑
i=1
∫
Θ
I(Zi;V | θ)dFi(θ) ≤
n∑
i=1
sup
θ∈Θ
I(Zi;V | θ). (40)
The representation (40) is the key to our calculations in this appendix.
In addition, the proofs of Lemmas 5 and 7 require a minor lemma, which we present here before
giving the proofs proper.
Lemma 12. Let 1 > p > δ > 0 and p+ δ ≤ 1. Then
(p+ δ) log(p + δ) + (p− δ) log(p− δ) > 2p log p.
Proof Since the function p 7→ f(p) = p log p is strictly convex over [0,∞), we may apply
convexity. Indeed, p = 12 (p+ δ) +
1
2(p − δ), so
p log p = f
(
1
2
(p+ δ) +
1
2
(p− δ)
)
<
1
2
f(p+ δ) +
1
2
f(p− δ),
which is the desired result.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The subgradient set ∂ℓ(Xi; θ) is independent of θ, so we may use the inequality (40) to bound
the mutual information of V and a single sample Z while ignoring the dependence on θ. Define
M = M∞/L. Since the sampling scheme (26) is independent per-coordinate, we see immediately
that if Zj denotes the jth coordinate of Z then
I(Z;V ) = H(Z)−H(Z | V ) ≤ d log(2) −
d∑
j=1
H(Zj | V ).
Since V is uniformly chosen from one of 2d vectors, we additionally find that
I(Z;V ) ≤ d
[
log 2− 1
2d
∑
v∈V
H(Z | V = v)
]
.
By the choice of our sampling scheme for X and Z, we see that H(Z | V = v) is identical for each
v ∈ V, and we have
Q(Zj =M∞ | Vj = vj = 0) = Q(Zj = −M∞ | Vj = vj = 0) = 1
2
.
On the other hand, by our choice of sampling scheme, for the “on” index in V , we have
Q(Zj = −M∞ | Vj = vj = −1) = Q(Zj =M∞ | Vj = vj = 1)
= Q(Zj =M∞ | Xj = 1)P (Xj = 1 | Vj = vj = 1)
+Q(Zj =M∞ | Xj = −1)P (Xj = −1 | Vj = vj = 1)
=
(
M + 1
2M
)(
1 + δ
2
)
+
(
M − 1
2M
)(
1− δ
2
)
=
1
2
+
δ
2M
.
Consequently, defining the Bernoulli entropy h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p), then
I(Z;V ) ≤ d
[
log 2− 1
2d
(
(2d − 2) log 2 + 2h
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
))]
= log 2 +
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)
log
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)
+
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)
log
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)
.
The concavity of the function p 7→ log(p) yields that log(1/2 + p) ≤ log(1/2) + 2p, so
I(Z;V ) ≤ log 2 +
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)(
− log 2 + δ
M
)
+
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)(
− log 2− δ
M
)
=
δ2
M2
.
Making the substitution M =M∞/L completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
By using the inequality (40), a bound on the mutual information I(Z;V | θ) implies a bound on the
joint information in the statement of the lemma, so we focus on bounding the mutual information
of a single sample Z. In addition, it is no loss of generality to assume that r = 1.
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Define M = M∞/L to be the multiple of the ℓ∞-norm of the subgradients that we take, and
let Zj denote the jth coordinate of Z. Using the coordinate-wise independence of the sampling, we
have
I(Z;V | θ) = H(Z | θ)−H(Z | V, θ) ≤ d log(2)−
d∑
j=1
H(Zj | Vj, θj).
Now consider the distribution of Zj given Vj and θj. By symmetry, the distribution has identical
entropy for any value of Vj , so we may fix V = v and assume vj = without loss of generality. Then
for θj ∈ (−1, 1), the jth component of the subgradient ∂ℓ(X; θ) is −Xj, whence we see that
Q(Zj =M∞ | vj = 1, θj)
= Q(Zj =M∞ | Xj = 1, θj)P (Xj = 1 | vj = 1) +Q(Zj =M∞ | Xj = −1, θj)P (Xj = −1 | vj = 1)
=
(
M − 1
2M
)(
1 + δ
2
)
+
(
M + 1
2M
)(
1− δ
2
)
=
2M − 2δ
4M
=
1
2
− δ
2M
.
Similarly, Q(Zj = −M∞ | vj = 1, θj) = 12 + δ2M . If θj ≥ 1, then we have that the subgradient
∂|θj −Xj | = 1 with probability 1, and thus
Q(Zj =M∞ | vj = 1, θj) =
(
M + 1
2M
)(
1 + δ
2
)
+
(
M + 1
2M
)(
1− δ
2
)
=
1
2
,
which increases the entropy H(Zj | Vj , θj) by Lemma 12. Thus we see that the value θj minimizing
the entropy H(Zj | Vj, θj) is given by any θj ∈ (−1, 1), yielding Bernoulli marginal (12 + δ/2M, 12 −
δ/2M) on Zj | Vj . Summarizing, we have
I(Z;V | θ) ≤ d log(2) + d
[(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)
log
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)
+
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)
log
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)]
.
As in the proof of Lemma 4, we use the concavity of log to see that
I(Z;V | θ) ≤ d log(2) + d
[(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)
(− log(2) + δ/M) +
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)
(− log(2)− δ/M)
]
= d
(
1
2
+
δ
2M
)(
δ
M
)
+ d
(
1
2
− δ
2M
)(
− δ
M
)
=
dδ2
M2
.
Applying the bound (40) and replacing M =M∞/L completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Letting Z denote a single subgradient sample using the conditional distribution Q specified by
Proposition 2, we prove that
I(Z;V | θ) ≤ δ2∆(γ)2 for any θ ∈ Rd, (41)
which implies the lemma by the representation (40). Recall the SVM risk defined using the indi-
vidual hinge losses (33): by construction, whenever X = ei, then the loss is equal to L [r − θi]+.
We have
∂ℓ(ei, θ) = L
{
0 if θi > r
−ei otherwise and ∂ℓ(−ei, θ) = L
{
0 if θi < −r
ei otherwise.
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For the remainder of this proof, we use the shorthand
Dγ := e
γ + e−γ + 2(d − 2)
for the denominator in many of our expressions. If X = ei, then ∂ℓ(ei, θ) = Lei or 0 as θi ≤ r or
θi > r. Therefore, as we wish to communicate Lei or 0, the construction in Proposition 2 implies
Q(Z =M1ei | X = ei, θ) =
{
e−γ
Dγ
if θi ≤ r
1
2d if θi > r,
(42)
and similarly we have for j 6= i that
Q(Z =M1ej | X = ei, θ) =
{
1
Dγ
if θi ≤ r
1
2d if θi > r.
(43)
For X = −ei, we have the conditional distribution parallel to (42):
Q(Z =M1ei | X = −ei, θ) =
{
eγ
Dγ
if θi ≥ −r
1
Dγ
if θi < −r.
For any given θ, we have that
I(Z;V | θ) = H(Z | θ)−H(Z | V, θ) ≤ log(2d) − 1|V|
∑
v∈V
H(Z | θ, V = v) (44)
since the choice of V is uniform and Z takes on at most 2d values. We thus use the conditional
distributions (42) and (43) to compute the entropy H(Z | θ, V ) (specifically, the minimal such
entropy across all values of θ). To do this, we compute the marginal distribution Q(z | v), arguing
that H(Z | θ, V ) is minimal for θ ∈ int[−r, r]d. When θj ∈ (−r, r) for all j, we have
Q(Z =M1ei | V = v, θ) =
d∑
j=1
Q(Z =M1ei | X = ej , θ)P (X = ej | V = v)
+
d∑
j=1
Q(Z =M1ei | X = −ej , θ)P (X = −ej | V = v).
When vi = 1, we thus have that
Q(Z =M1ei | V = v, θ) = 1 + δ
2d
e−γ
Dγ
+
1− δ
2d
eγ
Dγ
+
∑
j 6=i
1
Dγ
(
1 + δvj
2d
+
1− δvj
2d
)
=
eγ + e−γ + δ(e−γ − eγ)
2dDγ
+
d− 1
dDγ
=
1
2d
+
δ(e−γ − eγ)
2dDγ
, (45a)
and under the same condition,
Q(Z = −M1ei | A = v, θ) = e
γ + e−γ + δ(eγ + e−γ)
2dDγ
+
d− 1
dDγ
=
1
2d
+
δ(eγ − e−γ)
2dDγ
. (45b)
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If for any (possibly multiple) indices j we have θj 6∈ (−r, r), then via a bit of algebra and the
conditional distributions (42) and (43), we see that there exists an ǫ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Q(Z =M1ei | V = v, θ) = ǫ 1
2d
+ (1− ǫ)
(
1
2d
+
δ(e−γ − eγ)
2dDγ
)
.
Lemma 12 then implies that if θ ∈ int[−r, r]d while θ′ 6∈ int[−r, r]d, then
H(Z | θ, V = v) < H(Z | θ′, V = v).
Since we seek an upper bound on the mutual information, we may thus assume without loss of
generality that θ ∈ int[−r, r]d.
Now we compute the entropy H(Z | θ, v) using the marginal conditional distributions (45a)
and (45b), which describe Z | V when θ ∈ int[−r, r]d. Indeed, recall the definition in the statement
of the lemma of the difference ∆(γ). For z ∈ {±M1ej}dj=1, define the relation z ∼ v to mean that
if z =M1ei, then vi = 1 and if z = −M1ei then vi = −1. We then see that the entropy is
H(Z | θ, V = v) = −
∑
z∼v
Q(z | v, θ) logQ(z | v, θ)−
∑
z 6∼v
Q(z | v, θ) logQ(z | v, θ)
= −d
(
1
2d
+
δ∆(γ)
2d
)
log
(
1
2d
+
δ∆(γ)
2d
)
− d
(
1
2d
− δ∆(γ)
2d
)
log
(
1
2d
− δ∆(γ)
2d
)
.
As in the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, we use the concavity of log(·) to see that
−H(Z | θ, V = v) =
(
1
2
+
δ∆(γ)
2
)
log
(
1
2d
+
δ∆(γ)
2d
)
+
(
1
2
− δ∆(γ)
2
)
log
(
1
2d
− δ∆(γ)
2d
)
≤
(
1
2
+
δ∆(γ)
2
)
(− log(2d) + δ∆(γ)) +
(
1
2
− δ∆(γ)
2
)
(− log(2d)− δ∆(γ))
= − log(2d) + δ2∆(γ)2.
Invoking the earlier bound (44) and adding log(2d) to the above expression completes the proof of
the claim (41).
B.4 Proof of Lemma 8
Let Zj denote the jth coordinate of Z. We first argue that conditional on V , the random variable
Z has independent coordinates. Indeed, let q+ = q(z | x) for z such that z⊤x > k and q− = e−αq+.
Without loss of generality, we may take V = e1, the first basis vector, and hence
Q(Z = z | V = e1) =
∑
x∈{−1,1}d
Q(Z = z | X = x)P (X = x | V = e1)
=
1
2d−1
∑
x∈{−1,1}d
Q(Z = z | X = x) · 1 + x1δ
2
=
1
2d−1
[ ∑
x:〈z,x〉>k
q+
1 + x1δ
2
+
∑
x:〈z,x〉≤k
q−
1 + x1δ
2
]
. (46)
Now, if z1 = 1, then∑
x:〈x,z〉>k
1 + x1δ
2
=
∑
x:〈x,z〉>k,x1=1
1 + δ
2
+
∑
x:〈x,z〉>k,x1=−1
1− δ
2
=
1 + δ
2
Cd−1(k−1)+ 1− δ
2
Cd−1(k+1)
and similarly∑
x:〈x,z〉≤k
1 + x1δ
2
=
1 + δ
2
(
2d−1 − Cd−1(k − 1)
)
+
1− δ
2
(
2d−1 − Cd−1(k + 1)
)
.
On the other hand, we find that if z1 = −1, then similar equalities hold, but with the counters
Cd−1(k − 1) and Cd−1(k + 1) flipped:∑
x:〈x,z〉>k
1 + x1δ
2
=
1 + δ
2
Cd−1(k + 1) +
1− δ
2
Cd−1(k − 1)
∑
x:〈x,z〉≤k
1 + x1δ
2
=
1 + δ
2
(
2d−1 − Cd−1(k + 1)
)
+
1− δ
2
(
2d−1 − Cd−1(k − 1)
)
.
In particular, we find that so long as the first coordinate z1 = z
′
1 of z remains constant, then
Q(Z = z | V = e1) = Q(Z = z′ | V = e1), and that we thus have Z2, . . . , Zd are distributed
uniformly at random in {−1, 1}d.
We now determine q+ and compute the marginal value Q(Z1 = 1 | V = e1). For the first, we
note that
Cd(k)q
+ + (2d − Cd(k))q− = 1, or Cd(k)q+ + e−α(2d − Cd(k))q+ = 1,
which yields the expressions
q+ =
eα
(eα − 1)Cd(k) + 2d
and q− =
1
(eα − 1)Cd(k) + 2d
.
By the expression (46) and calculations following, we thus find that when z1 = 1, we have
q(z | e1) = 1
2d−1
·
[
q+
(1 + δ
2
Cd−1(k − 1) + 1− δ
2
Cd−1(k + 1)
)
+ q−
(1 + δ
2
(2d−1 − Cd−1(k − 1)) + 1− δ
2
(2d−1 − Cd−1(k + 1))
)]
=
1
2d−1
·
[
2d−1q− +
1
2
(q+ − q−)(Cd−1(k − 1) + Cd−1(k + 1))
+
δ
2
(q+ − q−)(Cd−1(k − 1)− Cd−1(k + 1))
]
, (47a)
and similarly when z1 = −1 we have
q(z | e1) = 1
2d−1
·
[
2d−1q− +
1
2
(q+ − q−)(Cd−1(k − 1) + Cd−1(k + 1))
− δ
2
(q+ − q−)(Cd−1(k − 1)− Cd−1(k + 1))
]
. (47b)
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Now note that
Cd−1(k − 1)− Cd−1(k + 1) =
⌈(d−k)/2⌉−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
−
⌈(d−k)/2⌉−2∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
=
(
d− 1
⌈(d− k)/2⌉ − 1
)
and that the difference
q+ − q− = e
α − 1
(eα − 1)Cd(k) + 2d
.
Recalling the definition of the constant ∆, we thus find from the expansions (47a) and (47b)—since
they must sum to 1—that
Q(Z = z | V = e1) = 1
2d−1
·
{
1
2 +
∆(δ,α,d,k)
2 if z1 = 1
1
2 − ∆(δ,α,d,k)2 if z1 = −1.
(48)
It is clear that similar statements hold in the other symmetric cases (i.e. if V = −e2, then the
probabilities depend on z2 = −1 or 1).
It remains to use the marginalized representation (48) to compute the bound on the mutual
information in the statement of the lemma. Given V = v, Z ∈ {−M,M}d is uniform except on
the coordinate j for which vj 6= 0, by symmetry. (Marginally, Z is uniform on {−M,M}d.) By a
direct calculation, we have H(Z) = d log 2 and
H(Z | V = e1) =
d∑
j=1
H(Zj | Z1:j−1, V = e1) = H(Z1 | V = e1) + (d− 1) log 2,
and similarly for the other possible values of V . Therefore, using the probabilities (48), we have
the mutual information bound
I(Z;V ) = H(Z)−H(Z | V ) ≤ d log 2− 1
2d
∑
v
H(Z | V = v)
= d log 2− (d− 1) log 2
+
(
1
2
+
∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)
log
(
1
2
+
∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)
+
(
1
2
− ∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)
log
(
1
2
− ∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)
≤ log 2 +
(
1
2
+
∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)[
log
1
2
+ ∆(δ, α, d, k)
]
+
(
1
2
− ∆(δ, α, d, k)
2
)[
log
1
2
−∆(δ, α, d, k)
]
= ∆(δ, α, d, k)2 ,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of p 7→ log(p).
B.5 Bounds on total variation norm
Lemma 13. Let Q1 and Q−1 be distributions on {−1, 1}, where
Q1(Z = z) =
1
2
+
1
2
·
{
δ if z = 1
−δ otherwise and Q−1(Z = z) =
1
2
+
1
2
·
{
−δ if z = 1
δ otherwise.
Let Qni denote the n-fold product distribution of Qi. Then for δ ∈ [0, 1/3],∥∥Qn1 −Qn−1∥∥TV ≤ δ√(3/2)n.
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Proof For any two probability distributions P,Q, Pinsker’s inequality [8] asserts that the total
variation norm is bounded as ‖P −Q‖TV ≤
√
Dkl (P‖Q) /2. Applying this inequality in our setting,
we find that ∥∥Qn1 −Qn−1∥∥TV ≤
√
1
2
Dkl
(
Qn1‖Qn−1
)
=
1√
2
√
nDkl (Q1‖Q−1),
where we have exploited the product nature of Qni . Now we note that by the concavity of the log,
we have (via the first-order inequality) that log 1+δ1−δ ≤ 2δ/(1 − δ), so
1 + δ
2
log
1+δ
2
1−δ
2
+
1− δ
2
log
1−δ
2
1+δ
2
=
1 + δ
2
log
1 + δ
1− δ +
1− δ
2
log
1− δ
1 + δ
= δ log
1 + δ
1− δ ≤
2δ2
1− δ .
Assuming that δ ≤ 1/3, the final term is upper bounded by 3δ2. But of course by definition of Q1
and Q−1, we have
Dkl (Q1‖Q−1) = 1 + δ
2
log
1+δ
2
1−δ
2
+
1− δ
2
log
1−δ
2
1+δ
2
≤ 3δ2,
which completes the proof.
C Achievability by stochastic mirror descent
In this appendix, we provide further details on the algorithm used to achieve the upper bounds in
Theorems 4 and 5. Both of our achievability results rely on stochastic gradient mechanisms, and
their most important ingredient is a conditional distribution Q that satisfies α-local differential
privacy. In particular, if g ∈ Rd is a (sub)gradient of the loss ℓ(x, θ), we construct Z ∈ Rd by
perturbing g in such a way that E[Z | g] = g. Thus, each of the achievability guarantees consists of
describing an α-differentially private sampling distribution, then bounding the expected norm of Z
and applying one of the convergence guarantees (14).
C.1 Achievability in Theorem 4
The sampling strategy we use is essentially identical to that used in Corollary 3 (and the optimal
α-private scheme of Proposition 3; see also Strategy B in our paper [12]). Let πα := e
α/(eα+1) and
T be a Bernoulli(πα)-random variable, and let B ≥ L be a fixed constant (to be specified). Then
given a vector g ∈ Rd with ‖g‖∞ ≤ L, construct g˜ ∈ Rd with coordinates g˜j sampled independently
from {−L,L} with probabilities 1/2 − gj/(2L) and 1/2 + gj/(2L). Then sample T and set
Z ∼
{
Uniform(z ∈ {−B,B}d : 〈z, g˜〉 > 0) if T = 1
Uniform(z ∈ {−B,B}d : 〈z, g˜〉 ≤ 0) if T = 0. (49)
By inspection, the scheme (49) is α-differentially private. Moreover, we have by the calculations in
the proof of Corollary 3 (see Section 5.9) that by the sampling strategy (49)
E[Z | g] = E[E[Z | g˜] | g] = g B
2d−1L
eα − 1
eα + 1
·
{(d−1
d−1
2
)
d odd(d−1
d/2
)
d even.
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Thus, w.l.o.g. assuming d is odd, choosing
B = 2d−1L
eα + 1
eα − 1
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)−1
implies E[Z | g] = g and ‖Z‖∞ = B = O(1)(L/α)
√
d.
Applying the mirror descent method to the gradients provided from the sampling strategy (49), we
obtain the bound (14a) with M∞ = B = O(1)(L/α)
√
d, which is our desired result.
C.2 Achievability in Theorem 5
The achievability result for Theorem 5 is similar to that for Theorem 4, but we use a modified
sampling distribution. Now, using the same notation as that for the strategy (49), we use the
following. Given a vector g with ‖g‖2 ≤ L, set g˜ = Lg/ ‖g‖2 with probability 12 + ‖g‖2 /2L and
g˜ = −Lg/ ‖g‖2 with probability 12 − ‖g‖2 /2L. Then sample T ∼ Bernoulli(πα) and set
Z ∼
{
Uniform(z ∈ Rd : 〈z, g˜〉 > 0, ‖z‖2 = B) if T = 1
Uniform(z ∈ Rd : 〈z, g˜〉 ≤ 0, ‖z‖2 = B) if T = 0.
(50)
(This is Strategy A in our paper [12].) Then we have [12, Appendix D.1] that
E[Z | g] = B
L
eα − 1
eα + 1
Γ(d2 + 1)√
πdΓ(d−12 + 1)
,
so choosing
B = L
eα + 1
eα − 1
√
πdΓ(d−12 + 1)
Γ(d2 + 1)
≤ Le
α + 1
eα − 1
3
√
π
√
d
2
implies that E[Z | g] = g and ‖Z‖2 ≤ B = O(1)(L/α)
√
d. Applying the stochastic gradient descent
method to the gradients provided by the sampling scheme (50), we obtain the bound (14b) with
M2 = B, which implies that if Θ ⊂ B2(r2) then
E[R(θ̂n)]−R(θ∗) = O
(√
d
α
Lr2√
n
)
.
Noting that Bq(rq) ⊂ d
1
2
− 1
qB2(rq) completes the proof of the achievability result.
D Background on Conditional Probabilities
In this appendix, we present some basic lemmas on conditional independence and regular conditional
probabilities that will be useful in Appendix E.
We first recall the following classical data-processing inequality, which holds for essentially
arbitrary random variables [23, Chapter 5]:
Lemma 14 (Data processing). Let X → Z → Y be a Markov chain. Then I(X;Y ) ≤ I(X;Z),
with equality if and only if X is conditionally independent of Y given Z.
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This inequality, in conjunction with with Carathe´odory and Minkowski’s finite-dimensional
version of the Krein-Milman theorem (e.g. [26]), allows us to argue any Q minimizing I(P,Q) must
be supported on the extreme points of D. To make this point precise, however, we need to address
certain measurability issues involved in the choice of the extreme points.
We begin with a precise definition of a regular conditional probability.
Definition 5. Let (Ω,F) and (T, σ(T )) be measurable spaces. A regular conditional probability,
also known as a Markov kernel or transition probability, is a function ν : T ×F → [0, 1] such that
t 7→ ν(t, A) is measurable for all A ∈ F
ν(t, ·) : F → [0, 1] is a probability measure for all t ∈ T.
Any Markov chain has a transition probability; conversely, any set of consistent transition proba-
bilities define a Markov chain (see, e.g., Chapter 5 of Kallenberg [27]).
Some difficulties with measurability arise in constructing the appropriate Markov chain for
our setting. To deal with them, we use results from Choquet theory, which extend Krein-Milman
theorems to integral representations [39]. We begin our proof by stating a measurable selection the-
orem [39, Theorem 11.4], though we restrict the theorem’s statement to subsets of finite dimensional
space.
Proposition 5. Let D ⊂ Rd be a compact convex set. For each x, there exists a probability measure
µx supported on Ext(D) such that
∫
D ydµx(y) = x. Moreover, the mapping x 7→ µx can be taken
to be measurable.
In the statement of this result, measurability is taken with respect to the σ-field generated by the
topology of weak convergence. As a consequence of the proposition, however, it is clear that since
for any continuous function f the mapping x 7→ ∫ fdµx is measurable, we have that for relatively
open sets A ⊂ C the mapping x 7→ µx(A) is measurable, whence for any measurable set A ⊂ C the
mapping x 7→ µx(A) is measurable. That is, we can define the Markov kernel ν : Rd×σ(C)→ [0, 1]
according to the mapping specified by Proposition 5 (we take ν(x, ·) = µx) with the additional
properties that ∫
D
yν(x, dy) = x and ν(x,D \ Ext(D)) = 0 for all x ∈ D.
In finite dimensions, a trivial extension of Proposition 5 allows us to drop the assumption that D
is convex. Indeed, we have that since D is compact, then Ext(D) = Ext(Conv(D)) [26, Chapter
III.2].
Given this measure-theoretic background, we turn to a key lemma that we will need in Ap-
pendix E. In this lemma, we assume as usual that C ⊂ D ⊂ Rd are compact sets, and that
Q ∈ Q(C,D) (recall the definition (10b)).
Lemma 15. Let P be a distribution supported on C. If there exists a set A ⊂ C with P (A) > 0
and a set B ⊂ D \ Ext(D) with Q(B | X = x) > 0 for x ∈ A, there exists a regular conditional
probability distribution Q′ ∈ Q(C,D) where Q′(· | x) has support contained in Ext(D) and
I(P,Q) > I(P,Q′).
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Paraphrasing the lemma slightly, we have that any conditional distribution Q minimizing I(P,Q)
must (outside of a set of measure zero) be completely supported on the extreme points Ext(D).
Proof For any y ∈ D, Proposition 5 guarantees that we can represent y as the (regular condi-
tional) measure ν(y, ·). Thus we can define a random variable Zy distributed according to ν(y, ·),
whose existence we are guaranteed by standard constructions [4, 27] with regular conditional prob-
ability. Then E[Zy] =
∫
D zν(y, dz) = y, and moreover, we can define the measurable version of the
conditional expectation E[ZY | Y ] via
E[ZY | Y ] =
∫
D
zν(Y, dz) = Y
so we have the (almost sure) chain of equalities
E[ZY | X = x] = E[E[ZY | Y ] | X = x] =
∫
D
E[ZY | Y = y]dQ(y | X = x)
=
∫
D
∫
D
zν(y, dz)dQ(y | X = x) =
∫
D
ydQ(y | X = x) = x.
By construction, X → Y → Z is a valid Markov chain, and since the sets A and B satisfy P (A) > 0
and
∫
AQ(B | X = x)dP (x) > 0, we see that I(X;Y ) > I(X;Z) by Lemma 14.
We turn to an analogue of Lemma 15 in the differentially private setting.
Lemma 16. Let the conditions of Lemma 15 hold, and let P be a distribution supported on C. If
there exists a set A ⊂ C with P (A) > 0 and a set B ⊂ D \ Ext(D) with Q(B | X = x) > 0 for
x ∈ A, there exists a regular conditional probability distribution Q′ ∈ Q (C,D) where Q′(· | x) has
support contained in Ext(D), satisfies
I(P,Q) > I(P,Q′),
and has no worse differential privacy than Q:
sup
S∈σ(D)
sup
x,x′∈C
Q′(S | X = x)
Q′(S | X = x′) ≤ supS∈σ(D)
sup
x,x′∈C
Q(S | X = x)
Q(S | X = x′) .
Proof Let ν : Rd × σ(C) → [0, 1] be the Markov kernel defined in the proof of Lemma 15, and
without loss of generality assume that Q(· | X = x) and Q(· | X = x′) have density q with respect
to an underlying measure µx,x′. Define the distribution
Q′(S | X = x) :=
∫
D
∫
D
ν(y, dz)q(y | x)dµx,x′(y).
By assumption, if Q is α-differentially private, then for µ-almost all y ∈ D, we have q(y | x) ≤
eαq(y | x′). We find that
Q′(S | X = x) =
∫
D
∫
D
ν(y, dz)q(y | x)dµx,x′(y)
≤
∫
D
∫
D
ν(y, dz)eαq(y | x′)dµx,x′(y) = eαQ′(S | X = x′),
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so Q′ is at least as differentially private as Q.
Finally, we will need the following standard maximum entropy result. Let z denote a discrete
random variable and let q(z | x) denote the conditional probability mass function of Z | X = x.
Consider the finite dimensional entropy maximization problem
minimize
q
∑
z
q(z | x) log q(z | x) (51)
subject to
∑
z
zq(z | x) = x,
∑
z
q(z | x) = 1, q(z | x) ≥ 0 for all z.
We have the following lemma, which establishes the form of the solution to the problem (51). We
include a proof for completeness.
Lemma 17. The p.m.f. q(· | x) solving problem (51) is given by
q(z | x) = exp(−µ
⊤z)∑
z′ exp(−µ⊤z′)
, (52)
where µ ∈ Rd is any vector chosen to satisfy the constraint ∑z zq(z | x) = x. Such a µ ∈ Rd exists.
Proof We may write the Lagrangian with dual variables µ ∈ Rd, λ(z) ≥ 0, and θ ∈ R,
L(q, µ, λ, θ) =
∑
z
q(z | x) log q(z | x)+µ⊤
(∑
z
zq(z | x)−x
)
+θ
(∑
z
q(z | x)−1
)
−
∑
z
λ(z)q(z | x).
Since the problem (51) has convex cost, linear constraints, and non-empty domain, strong duality
obtains [6, Chapter 5], and the KKT conditions hold for the problem. Thus, minimizing q out of
L to find the dual, we take derivatives with respect to the m variables q(z | x) for z = (1 + α)ui
and find the optimal conditional p.m.f. q must satisfy
log q(z | x) + 1 + µ⊤z + θ − λ(z) = 0, or q(z | x) = exp(λ(z) − 1− θ) exp(−µ⊤z).
In particular, we see that since q(z | x) > 0, we must have λ(z) = 0 by complementarity, and
(satisfying the summability constraint
∑
z q(z | x) = 1) we see that
q(z | x) = exp(−µ
⊤z)∑
z′ exp(−µ⊤z′)
,
where µ ∈ Rd is any vector chosen to satisfy the constraint∑z zq(z | x) = x. The existence of such
a µ is guaranteed by the attainment of the KKT conditions.
E Proofs of Minimax Mutual Information Characterizations
In this section, we provide the proofs of the results stated in Section 4, all of which follow a
broadly similar outline. We make use of Lemma 15 to guarantee that any conditional distribution
Q minimizing the mutual information I(P,Q) must be supported on the extreme points of the set
D. This allows us to reduce computing maximal entropies and minimal mutual information values
to finite dimensional convex programs, whose optimality we can check using results from convex
analysis and optimization.
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E.1 Proof of Theorem 6
We begin by considering supP , where Q
∗ is defined as in the statement of the theorem. Since the
support of Q∗ is finite (there are m extreme points of D), we have
I(P,Q∗) = I(X;Z) = H(Z)−H(Z | X) ≤ log(m)−H(Z | X)
= log(m)−
∫
H(Z | X = x)dP (x).
Now, for any distribution P on the set C and for any x ∈ suppP , we can write x as x =∑i βi(x)ui,
where ui are the extreme points of C, and where βi(x) ≥ 0 and
∑
i βi(x) = 1 (using the Krein-
Milman theorem). Define the individual probability mass functions qi to be the maximum entropy
p.m.f. (52) for each of the extreme points ui. Then we can define the conditional probability mass
function by
q(· | x) =
∑
i
βi(x)q
i(·).
(Without loss of generality, we may assume the βi are continuous, since the set of extreme points
is finite, and thus q(· | x) can be viewed as a regular conditional probability. We can make this
formal using the techniques in the proof of Lemma 15.) Denoting H(q(· | x)) := H(Z | X = x), we
can use the convexity of the negative entropy to see that
I(P,Q∗) ≤ log(m)−
∫ ∑
i
βi(x)H(q
i(·))dP (x). (53)
By symmetry, the entropy H(qi(·)) = H(Q∗(· | X = ui)) is a constant determined by the maximum
entropy distribution (52), and thus
I(P,Q∗) ≤ log(m)−H(Q∗(· | X = ui)). (54)
Equality in the upper bound (54) is attained by taking P ∗ to be the uniform distribution on the
extreme points {ui} of C.
It remains to establish an identical lower bound for I(P ∗, Q) over all conditional distributions
Q satisfying the constraints of the theorem statement. We know from Lemma 15 that Q must be
supported on (1 + κ)ui for i = 1, . . . ,m. Denoting by q(z | x) the p.m.f. of Q conditional on x
(for x in the finite set of extreme points of C that make up the support suppP ∗), we can write
minimizing the mutual information as the parametric convex optimization problem
minimize
q
∑
z
(∑
x
q(z | x)p(x)
)
log
(∑
x
q(z | x)p(x)
)
−
∑
x
p(x)
∑
z
q(z | x) log q(z | x) (55)
subject to
∑
z
q(z | x) = 1 for all x,
∑
z
zq(z | x) = x for all x, q(z | x) ≥ 0 for all x, z.
In the problem (55), the sums over x and z are over the extreme points of C and D, respectively
and p is the uniform distribution with p(x) = 1/m. Mutual information is convex in the conditional
distribution q; moreover, it is strictly convex except when q(z | x) =∑x′ q(z | x′)p(x′) for all x, z.
(This can be seen by an inspection of the proof of Theorem 2.7.4 by Cover and Thomas [8].) In our
case, since Q∗ does not satisfy this equality, the uniqueness of Q∗ as the minimizer of I(P ∗, Q∗)
will follow if we show that Q∗ is a minimizer at all.
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We proceed to solve the problem (55). Writing I(p, q) as a shorthand for the mutual information,
we introduce Lagrange multiplers θ(x) ∈ R for the normalization constraints, µ(x) ∈ Rd for the
conditional expectation constraints, and λ(x, z) ≥ 0 for the nonnegativity constraints. This yields
the Lagrangian
L(q, µ, λ, θ) = I(p, q)−
∑
x,z
λ(x, z)q(z | x)+
∑
x
µ(x)⊤
(∑
z
zq(z | x)−x
)
+
∑
x
θ(x)
(∑
z
q(z | x)−1
)
.
If we can satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (see, e.g., [6]) for optimality of the
problem (55), we will be done. Taking derivatives with respect to q(z | x), we see
∂
∂q(z | x)L(q, µ, λ, θ) = p(x) [log(q(z | x)) + 1]− p(x) log
(∑
x′
q(z | x′)p(x′)
)
− q(z) · 1
q(z)
p(x)− λ(z, x) + θ(x) + µ(x)⊤z
= p(x) log q(z | x)− p(x) log
(∑
x′
q(z | x′)p(x′)
)
− λ(z, x) + θ(x) + µ(x)⊤z,
where we set q(z) =
∑
x′ q(z | x′)p(x′) for shorthand. Now, we use symmetry to note that since we
have chosen q to be the maximum entropy distribution (52) for each x in the extreme points {ui}
of C, the marginal q(z) =
∑
x′ q(z | x′)p(x′) = 1/m is uniform by the symmetry of the set D and
since p is uniform. In addition, since q(z | x) > 0 strictly, we have λ(z, x) = 0 by complementarity.
Thus, at q chosen to be the maximum entropy distribution, we can rewrite the derivative of the
Lagrangian
∂
∂q(z | x)L(q, µ, λ, θ) =
1
m
log q(z | x)− 1
m
log
1
m
+ θ(x) + µ(x)⊤z.
Recalling the definition (52) of q(z | x), and denoting the maximum entropy parameters µ there by
µ∗(x), we have
∂
∂q(z | x)L(q, µ, λ, θ) = −
1
m
µ∗(x)⊤z +
1
m
log
(∑
z′
exp(−µ∗(x)⊤z′)
)
− 1
m
log
1
m
+ θ(x) + µ(x)⊤z.
Now, by inspection we may set
θ(x) =
1
m
log
1
m
− 1
m
log
(∑
z′
exp(−µ∗(x)⊤z′)
)
and µ(x) =
1
m
µ∗(x),
and we satisfy the KKT conditions for the mutual information minimization problem (55).
Summarizing, the conditional distribution Q∗ specified in the statement of the theorem as the
maximum entropy distribution (52) satisfies
inf
Q
I(P ∗, Q) ≥ I(P ∗, Q∗),
which, when combined with the first part of the proof, gives the saddle point inequality
sup
P
I(P,Q∗) ≤ log(m)−H(q(· | X = ui)) = I(P ∗, Q∗) ≤ inf
Q
I(P ∗, Q),
as claimed.
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Remarks In the proof of the theorem, we have defined Q∗(· | x) as a conditional distribution
only for x ∈ Ext(C), the extreme points of C. This can easily be remedied: take Q∗(· | x) to be
the distribution maximizing the entropy H(Z | X = x) for each x ∈ C under the constraint that
the support of Z be contained in Ext(D). This is equivalent to—for each x ∈ C—choosing Z = zi
for zi ∈ Ext(D), i = 1, . . . ,m, with probability qi, where q ∈ Rm solves the entropy maximization
problem
maximize
q∈Rm
−
∑
i
qi log qi subject to
∑
i
ziqi = x,
∑
i
qi = 1, qi ≥ 0.
Inspecting the proof of Theorem 6 (see the bound (53)) shows that this choice can only decrease
the mutual information I(X;Z). Additionally, the strong convexity of the entropy over the simplex
guarantees that the solutions to this optimization problem are continuous in x (see Chapter X
of Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal [26]) so this distribution q(· | x) defines a measurable random
variable as desired.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By scaling, we may assume w.l.o.g. that L = 1 and M ≥ 1. Using Theorem 6 (and the remarks
immediately following its proof), we can focus on maximizing the entropy of the random variable
Z conditional on X = x for each fixed x ∈ [−1, 1]d. Let Zi denote the ith coordinate of the random
vector Z; we take the conditional distribution of Zi to be independent of Zj and let Z be distributed
as
Zi | X =
{
M w.p. 12 +
Xi
2M
−M w.p. 12 − Xi2M .
(56)
Let us now verify that the distribution (56) maximizes the entropy H(Z | X = x). Indeed, we may
fix x (leaving it implicit in the vector [q(z)]z := [q(z | x)]z), and we solve the entropy maximization
problem
minimize
q
−H(q) subject to
∑
z
q(z) = 1, q(z) ≥ 0,
∑
z
zq(z) = x, (57)
where all sums are taken over z ∈ Ext([−M,M ]d) = {−M,M}d. Introducing the Lagrange multi-
pliers µ ∈ Rd, λ(z) ≥ 0, and θ ∈ R, we find that problem (57) has the Lagrangian
L(q, µ, λ, θ) = −H(q)−
∑
z
λ(z)q(z) + µ⊤
(∑
z
zq(z)− x
)
+ θ
(∑
z
q(z)− 1
)
.
To find the infimum of the Lagrangian with respect to q, we take derivatives (since we make the
identification q ∈ R2d). We see that
∂
∂q(z)
L(q, µ, λ, θ) = log(q(z)) + 1− λ(z) + θ + µ⊤z.
With the definition (56) of the probability mass function q (that zi are independent Bernoulli
random variables with parameters 12 + xi/2M), the coordinate conditional distributions are
q(zi | xi) =
(
1
2
+
1
2M
) 1
2
+
xizi
2M
(
1
2
− 1
2M
) 1
2
−
xizi
2M
.
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Theorem 6 says that without loss of generality we may assume that x ∈ {−1, 1}d, the full probability
mass function q can be written
q(z) =
(
1
2
+
1
2M
) d
2
+x
⊤z
2M
(
1
2
− 1
2M
) d
2
−x
⊤z
2M
. (58)
Plugging the conditional (58) results in
∂
∂q(z)
L(q, µ, λ, θ)
=
(
d
2
+
x⊤z
2M
)
log
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)
+
(
d
2
− x
⊤z
2M
)
log
(
1
2
− 1
2M
)
+ 1− λ(z) + θ + µ⊤z
=
d
2
[
log
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)
+ log
(
1
2
− 1
2M
)]
+
x⊤z
2M
[
log
(
1
2
+
1
2M
)
− log
(
1
2
− 1
2M
)]
+ 1− λ(z) + θ + µ⊤z.
Performing a few algebraic manipulations with the logarithmic terms, the final equality becomes
d log
(√
(M + 1)(M − 1)
M
)
+
x⊤z
M
log
(√
M + 1
M − 1
)
+ 1− λ(z) + θ + µ⊤z.
The complementarity conditions for optimality [6] imply that λ(z) = 0, and since the equality
constraints in the problem (57) are satisfied, we can choose θ and µ arbitrarily. Taking
θ = −d log
(√
(M + 1)(M − 1)
M
)
− 1 and µ = −x 1
M
log
(√
M + 1
M − 1
)
yields that the partial derivatives of L are 0, which shows that indeed our choice of Q∗ is optimal.
E.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows along lines similar to the ℓ∞ case: we compute the maximum entropy distribution
subject to the constraint that E[Z] = x for some x ∈ Rd with ‖x‖1 ≤ 1, and Z must be supported
on the extreme points ±Mei of the ℓ1-ball of radiusM . (Recall that ei ∈ Rd are the standard basis
vectors.) Based on Theorem 6, in order to find the minimax mutual information, we need only
consider the cases where x = ±ei for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Following this plan, we recall the entropy maximization problem (57), where now x = ±ei and
the sums are over z ∈ M{±ei}di=1. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we can write the Lagrangian
and take its derivatives, finding that for z = ±Mei we have
∂
∂q(z)
L(q, µ, λ, θ) = log(q(z)) + 1− λ(z) + θ − µ⊤z.
Solving for q(z), we find that
q(z) = exp(λ(z)− 1− θ) exp(µ⊤z),
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but complementarity [6] guarantees that λ(z) = 0 since q(z) > 0, and normalizing we may write
q(z) = exp(−µ⊤z)/ exp(−µ⊤∑z′ z′), where the sum is over the extreme points of the ℓ1-ball of
radius M . In particular, q(Mei) ∝ e−µi and q(−Mei) ∝ eµi . Without loss of generality, let x = ei.
Symmetry suggests we take (and we verify this to be true)
q(z) = exp(−1− θ)

exp(µi) if z =Mei
exp(−µi) if z = −Mei
exp(0) otherwise.
(59)
Indeed, with the choice (59) of q, we have q(Mej)− q(−Mej) = 0 for j 6= i, while (setting γ = µi
and normalizing appropriately)
q(Mei)− q(−Mei) = e
γ
e−γ + eγ + 2(d − 1) −
e−γ
e−γ + eγ + 2(d − 1) .
Thus, if we can solve the equation Mq(Mei) −Mq(−Mei) = 1, we will be nearly done. To that
end, we write
eγ − e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2(d− 1) =
1
M
or β − β−1 = 1
M
(
β + β−1 + 2(d− 1)) ,
where we identified β = eγ . Multiplying both sides by β, we have a quadratic equation in β:
β2 − 1 = 1
M
(
β2 + 2β(d− 1) + 1) or (M − 1)β2 − 2(d− 1)β − (M + 1) = 0,
whose solution is the positive root of
β =
2d− 2±
√
(2d − 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1) or γ = log
(
2d− 2 +
√
(2d − 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1)
)
.
By our construction, with γ so defined, we satisfy the constraints that M [q(Mei)− q(−Mei)] = 1
and q(Mej) − q(−Mej) = 0 for j 6= i. Since q belongs to the exponential family and satisfies the
constraints, it maximizes the entropy H(Z) as desired [8].
Algebraic manipulations and the computation of the conditional entropy H(Z | X = ei) give
the remainder of the statement of the proposition.
E.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The outline of the proof of Proposition 3 is as follows. Lemma 16 implies that any distribution
satisfying optimal local differential privacy must be supported on the extreme points of the outer
set D (as in the proof of Theorem 6). Given this result, we reduce the problem of finding an
optimally private distribution to a linear program, using symmetry arguments to simplify the LP.
Finally, we show that the solution to the linear program is unique, which means that we have found
the unique distribution satisfying optimal local differential privacy.
We begin by developing a reduction of the problem of finding a distribution with optimal local
differential privacy to a linear program. Note that there is a non-increasing mapping between M—
the radius of the larger ℓ∞ ball—and α
⋆. Indeed, whenever M increases, the set of distributions
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Q from which to choose a privacy channel increases, so α⋆ decreases. Put inversely, for a given
differential privacy level α, we can find the smallest M such that it is possible to construct an
α-differentially private channel Q mapping from [−1, 1]d to [−M,M ]d. (Lemma 19 shows that the
mapping from M to α⋆ is implicitly invertible.)
Thus, rather than solving for α as a function of M , we take the converse view of finding the
largest M such that an α-differentially private distribution exists. Fix d ∈ N and (with some abuse
of notation) let Z ∈ {−1, 1}d×2d be the matrix whose columns are the edges of the hypercube
{−1, 1}d. For each z, x ∈ {−1, 1}d, define the variables q(z | x) ≥ 0 to represent the conditional
probability of observing Mz given x. Let q(· | x) = [q(z | x)]z∈{−1,1}d denote the vector version of
q(z | x). Then we have that a α-differentially private channel providing an unbiased perturbtation
of vectors in [−1, 1]d to [−M,M ]d, exists only if we can find settings of q(z | x) such that
Zq(· | x)− 1
M
x = 0 for all x ∈ {−1, 1}d
while additionally q(z | x) ≤ eαq(z | x′) and ∑z q(z | x) = 1, q(z | x) ≥ 0 for all z, x, x′. Thus,
if we make the change of variables t = 1/M , we see that finding the smallest possible M—which
corresponds to the least perturbation possible for a given privacy level α—can be cast as solving
the linear program
minimize − t (60)
subject to Zq(· | x)− tx = 0 for all x ∈ {−1, 1}d
q(z | x) ≤ eαq(z | x′) for all x, x′, z ∈ {−1, 1}d∑
z
q(z | x) = 1, q(· | x)  0 for all x ∈ {−1, 1}d.
The solution vectors q(· | x), x ∈ {−1, 1}d, give the probability mass function for an α-differentially
private channel perturbing from [−1, 1]d to [−M,M ]d, where M = 1/t∗ and t∗ denotes the solution
to the LP. This p.m.f. is then optimally locally differentially private with α = α⋆([−1, 1]d, [−M,M ]d).
It is possible to calculate the solution of the LP (60) by hand, but it is tedious. We thus use
the structure of optimal local differential privacy to reduce the problem to a single minimization
problem over a vector q ∈ R2d (rather than a matrix [q(z | x)] ∈ R2d×2d). We have
Lemma 18. A distribution satisfying optimal local differential privacy must, for each x ∈ {−1, 1}d,
satisfy q(· | x) = Π(x)q, where Π(x) ∈ {0, 1}2d×2d is a permutation matrix and q is a fixed vector.
Proof Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case, but the vectors q(x) and
t solve the linear program (60). Let Q1 denote the matrix of the vectors q(· | x). Choose vectors
q(· | x) and q(· | x′) such that q(· | x) 6= Πq(· | x′) for any permutation matrix Π. Now construct
vectors q2(· | x) and q2(· | x′) such that q2(z | x) = q(z′ | x′), where z′ is chosen so that z′ix′i = zixi,
and similarly choose q2 so that q2(z | x′) = q(z′ | x), where zix′i = z′ixi. Let Q2 denote the matrix
of vectors q, but where q2(· | x) and q2(· | x′) replace q(· | x), q(· | x′). Then by construction, all the
constraints of the original linear program (60) are satisfied. By symmetry and the strict convexity
of the mutual information in the channel distribution Q, however, we see that
I(P,Q1) = I(P,Q2) =
1
2
(I(P,Q1) + I(P,Q2)) > I
(
P,
1
2
(Q1 +Q2)
)
.
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The decrease in mutual information gives the necessary contradiction.
With Lemma 18 in hand, we can now turn to the smaller linear program—in a single vector
q and for a single vector x ∈ {−1, 1}d—that will give us the locally optimal differentially private
channel. Indeed, we consider the linear program in the variables t ∈ R and q ∈ R2d , where we let
q(z) denote the entry of q corresponding to column z of Z:
minimize − t
subject to Zq − tx = 0, q(z) ≤ eαq(z′) for all z, z′,
∑
z
q(z) = 1, q ≥ 0. (61)
Define the constants
Kd =
⌊d/2⌋∑
i=0
(d− 2i)
(
d
i
)
and Cd = card
{
z ∈ {−1, 1}d : z⊤x > 0
}
=
{
2d−1 if d odd
2d−1 − 12
(
d
d/2
)
if d even.
We have the following lemma, which characterizes the structure of the solution vector q.
Lemma 19. Define α∗ = log Kd+2
d−Cd
Kd−Cd
. For any α < α∗, the unique solution to the linear pro-
gram (61) is given by
q(z) =
{
eα
eαCd+2d−Cd
if 〈z, x〉 > 0
1
eαCd+2d−Cd
otherwise.
Proof First, problem (61) is clearly equivalent to the linear program
minimize − t
subject to Zq − tx = 0, max
z
{q(z)} + eαmax
z
{−q(z)} ≤ 0,
∑
z
q(z) = 1, q ≥ 0. (62)
Our proof proceeds in two large steps: first, we argue that a q of the form specified in the lemma
is indeed the solution to the problem (62), then we use results on uniqueness of solutions to linear
programs due to Mangasarian [35].
For the first step, we begin by writing the Lagrangian to the problem (62). We introduce dual
variables θ ∈ R2d for the constraint Zq − tx = 0, λ ≥ 0 for the first inequality, τ ∈ R for the sum
constraint, and β ∈ R2d+ for the non-negativity of q. With this, we have Lagrangian
L(q, t, θ, λ, τ, β) = −t+θ⊤
(∑
z
q(z)− tx
)
+λmax
z
{q(z)}+eαmax
z
{−q(z)}+τ(1⊤q−1)−β⊤q. (63)
Recall the generalized subgradient KKT conditions for optimality of the solution to an optimization
problem [26, Chapter VII]. A vector q > 0 is optimal for the problem (62) if the constraints
maxi{qi} ≤ eαmini{qi} and
∑
i qi = 1 hold, there is a t ≥ 0 such that Zq− tx = 0, and we can find
θ, λ, and τ such that
Z⊤θ + λ [v+ − eαv−] + τ1 = 0, β = 0, and θ⊤x = −1, (64)
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where v+ and v− are vectors satisfying
v+ ∈ Conv
{
ei : qi = max
j
{qj}
}
and v− ∈ Conv
{
ei : qi = min
j
{qj}
}
.
That β = 0 follows by complementarity (recall that q > 0 is assumed).
If we can find settings for the vectors θ, λ, τ, and v± satisfying the KKT conditions (64), we are
done. To that end, set θ = −x/d. Then by inspection θ⊤x = −‖x‖22 /d = −1, and we can rewrite
the remaining KKT condition by noting that we must find vectors v+, v−, and τ ∈ R such that
− 1
d
Z⊤x+ v+ − eαv− + τ1 = 0, v⊤+1 = v⊤−1, v+ ≥ 0, v− ≥ 0,
v+(z) = 0 if q(z) < max
z
{q(z)}, and v−(z) = 0 if q(z) > min
z
{q(z)}.
(65)
Note that we have eliminated λ as it is a non-negative homogeneous scaling term on v+ and v−.
We choose values q+, q− with 0 < q− < q+ and set q(z) = q+ when z⊤x > 0 and q(z) = q− when
z⊤x ≤ 0, where q+, q− are chosen so that ∑z q(z) = 1. We now choose the values of v+, v−, and τ
satisfying the KKT conditions in expression (65) based on the values q+, q−. Indeed, set
v+(z) =
{
z⊤x
d − τ if z⊤x > 0
0 otherwise
and v−(z) =
{
−e−α z⊤xd + e−ατ if z⊤x ≤ 0
0 otherwise
(66)
By inspection, we see that −Z⊤x/d+ v+− eαv−+ τ = 0, so the only question remaining is whether
we can choose τ such that v± ≥ 0 and v⊤+1 = v⊤−1.
To that end, we recall the definition of the constant Kd, and we seek τ such that∑
z
v+(z) =
1
d
Kd − τCd = e−α 1
d
Kd + e
−ατ(2d − Cd) =
∑
z
v−(z)
by the symmetry in the sums. Rewriting the equation, we find that for equality we must have
τ
(
e−α(2d − Cd) + Cd
)
=
1
d
Kd(1− e−α) or τ = Kd
d
· e
α − 1
eαCd + 2d − Cd
=
Kd
dCd
· e
α − 1
eα + 2d/Cd − 1
.
Thus we find that if α is such that
Kd
dCd
eα − 1
eα + 2d/Cd − 1 <
1
d
, (67)
then by our choice (66) of the vectors v+ and v−, we have v+(z) > 0 whenever z
⊤x > 0, and
v−(z) > 0 whenever z
⊤x ≤ 0. Noting that by our setting of q(z), we have by symmetry of Z that
there exists a t > 0 such that Zq = tx, we find that our choice of q is optimal (since the KKT
conditions (65) hold).
We have two arguments remaining in the proof. The first is to show that for α < α∗ defined in
the statement of the lemma, the inequality (67) holds. Rewriting the inequality, we solve
eα − 1 = Cd
Kd
(
eα + 2d/Cd − 1
)
or eα
(
1− Cd
Kd
)
=
2d − Cd
Kd
+ 1, i.e. α∗ = log
Kd + 2
d − Cd
Kd − Cd .
For any α < α∗, the strict inequality (67) holds, so the setting (66) of v+ and v− satisfy the KKT
conditions.
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Our last argument regards the uniqueness of the two-valued solution vector q. For that, we
apply Mangasarian’s result [35, Theorem 1] that if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for any vector
u ∈ R2d with ‖u‖2 = 1, q is a solution of the linear program (61) when the objective is −t+ ǫu⊤q,
then q is unique. Luckily, this is not difficult given our previous work. The Lagrangian (63) for the
modified linear program becomes
ǫu⊤q − t+ θ⊤
(∑
z
q(z)− tx
)
+ λmax
z
{q(z)} + eαmax
z
{−q(z)} + τ(1⊤q − 1)− β⊤q.
The only modification in our KKT conditions (64) is that the first equality becomes
ǫu+ Z⊤θ + λ [v+ − eαv−] + τ1 = 0.
By the strictness of the inequalities v+(z) > 0 for z such that z
⊤x > 0 (and similarly for v−) in
the definitions (66) whenever α < α∗, we see that for suitably small ǫ > 0, the vectors v+ and v−
can be perturbed so that the KKT conditions are still satisfied. This proves the uniqueness of the
two-valued solution vector q.
Remarks Following an argument with completely the same structure as the proof, we see that
for any d ∈ N (say d ≥ 3), there are different “regimes” of α, that is, there exists a sequence
α∗0, α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
d−1 (or α
∗
d−2 if d is even) such that for α ∈ (α∗2i, α∗2i+2), the unique optimal solution to
the linear program (61) is given by taking
q(z) ∝
{
exp(α) for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 > 2(i+ 1)
1 for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 ≤ 2(i+ 1)
(for α < α∗0, we say i = −1 above). For α = α∗2i, the set of solutions is given by the convex
combinations of the solution vectors
q<(z) ∝
{
exp(α) for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 > 2i
1 for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 ≤ 2i and q>(z) ∝
{
exp(α) for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 > 2(i+ 1)
1 for z s.t. 〈z, x〉 ≤ 2(i+ 1),
which follows from arguments similar to our application of Mangasarian’s results [35].
Now we may complete the proof of Proposition 3. Indeed, we see from Lemma 19 that the
distribution satisfying optimal local differential privacy must assign probability masses at two
levels—at least when the point being perturbed comes from {−1, 1}d. Now let Q be a distribution
specified in the lemma. An argument identical to that in our proof of Proposition 1—by symmetry—
shows that the distribution P maximizing the mutual information I(P,Q) is uniform on {−1, 1}d.
The uniqueness of Q then follows from Lemmas 18 and 19, which show that such Q is the only
distribution that minimizes the radius M of the ball [−M,M ]d; inverting this bound gives the
proposition.
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E.5 Proof of Corollary 4
By scaling, we may assume that M ≥ L = 1 in the proof of the corollary. First, we claim that as
γ → 0, the following expansion holds:
log(2d)−log (eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2)+γ eγ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2−γ
e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2 =
γ2
2d
+Θ
(
γ4
d
)
. (68)
Before proving this, we use the expansion (68) to prove Corollary 4. Noting that
2d− 2 +
√
(2d− 2)2 + 4(M2 − 1)
2(M − 1) =
√
M + 1
M − 1 +
d− 1
M − 1 + Θ(d
2/M2),
we see that since log(1 + x) = x − x2/2 + Θ(x3), we have γ = dM + Θ
(
d2
M2
)
. Thus the mutual
information in Proposition 2 is
I(P ∗, Q∗) =
log2(
√
(M + 1)/(M − 1) + d/M +Θ(d2/M2))
2d
+Θ
(
log4(1 + d/M)
d
)
=
d
2M2
+Θ
(
min
{
d3
M4
,
log4(d)
d
})
.
Now we return to showing the claim (68). Indeed, define f(γ) = log(eγ + e−γ +2d− 2). Letting
f (i) denote the ith derivative of f , we have
f (1)(γ) =
eγ − e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2 , f
(2)(γ) =
(eγ + e−γ)(2d − 2) + 4
(eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2)2 ,
and
f (3)(γ) =
−(e2γ − e−2γ)(2d − 2)− 8(eγ − e−γ) + (2d− 2)2(eγ − e−γ)
(eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2)3 .
Via a Taylor expansion, we have f(0) = f(γ)− γf (1)(γ) + γ22 f (2)(γ) +O(f (3)(γ)γ3), and so substi-
tuting values for f(γ) and f (1)(γ), we have
log(2d) − log (eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2) + γ eγ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2 − γ
e−γ
eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2
=
(eγ + e−γ)(2d − 2) + 4
(eγ + e−γ + 2d− 2)2 ·
γ2
2
+O
(
f (3)(γ)γ3
)
.
A few simpler Taylor expansions yield that f (3)(γ) = O(γ/d), which means that all we have left to
tackle is f (2)(γ). But noting that
2
(
eγ + e−γ
)
= 4
(
1 +
γ2
2!
+
γ4
4!
+ · · ·
)
= 4 +O(γ2)
implies that f (2)(γ) = (4d+O(dγ2))/4d2, and hence (γ2/2)f (2)(γ) = γ2/2d+O(γ4/d), which yields
the result.
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